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Abstract
One of the central pillars of the new developmental agenda of the 1990s is a vibrant
and plural civil society. It has been argued that civil society is not only crucial to
safeguarding democracy but to extending democratic space. The absence of
democratic accountability has often been cited in explaining poor levels of
development in Africa. Given the resource weakness within civil society organisations
in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa many multilateral and bilateral donors have
intervened to support and manufacture civil society. While these interventions have
been going on little work has gone into theorising the forms of civil society that
would broaden democratic space. Donors have largely intervened to implement civil
society building programmes that are to their liking.
This research paper reviews recent literature. It evaluates the claims and the practice
of donor agencies. The paper also identifies key areas of donor interest, the
deployment of funding in pursuance of those interests and how these interests are
shaping civil society engagement. The paper argues that the structure of funding is
acting to exclude certain organisations that may hold the key to ensuring democratic
accountability. It also reviews the emerging literature on the ideological changes that
have attended the new developmental agenda of the late 1990s and their links with
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This chapter outlines the rationale for this dissertation; it formulates the problem
statement, discusses its potential value, lays out the underlying theoretical paradigms
and provides an overview of the following chapters. It also presents the necessary
insight into the reasons and predispositions behind the way in which the study was
followed.
1.1 Rationale of the Study
One of the dominant developments of the 1990s was the mainstreaming of civil society
as crucial to democracy (Putnam 1993, Hagenius and Uggala 1996). For some time
there appeared to be broad consensus on the importance of civil society. Beckman
(1993) contends that the "liberation of civil society from the suffocating grip of the state
has become the hegemonic ideological project of our time" (20). According to Habib and
Kotze (2002), the power and importance of civil society was "lauded by everybody from
the World Bank to small grassroots groupings and movements in the South" (4). On the
left 'this versatile idea has become an all-purpose catchword... embracing a wide range
of emancipatory aspirations, as well as - it must be said - as a whole set of excuses for
political retreat" (Wood 1990: 60). In Advancing Phi/anthrop~ William White of the Mott
Foundation argued that in eastern, central Europe and the former USSR, United States
Foundations had "an open window of opportunity ... to help nurture the establishment
of democracy" and that "the development of a civil society" was critical "if democracy
[was] to flourish there" (cited in Katz, 1994: 34). For Africa especially, this situation
appeared at the same time as certain Cold War geopolitical considerations had fallen
away and the failure of the state came to the fore. Essentially, scepticism about the
ability of the African state to deliver on development had heightened while Cold War
machinations on containing communism had vanished. For those intent on re-shaping
Africa this presented an unprecedented opportunity. "In Africa, more than in any other
region, the international community has scope to nurture and influence the fate of
democracy" (Diamond 1997:35).
With the new global order as epitomised by Francis Fukuyama's End ofHistory and the
Last Man (Fukuyama: http://homeJreeuk.com!ethos!endhist) leaving the academia and
taking practical shape, the narrow path to the creation of a 'proper' state was seen to
be through the promotion of a 'proper' civil society (Beckman 1993). According to
Stacey and Aksartova (2001) many American Foundations got in on the civil society
bandwagon. Katz (2000) argues that these institutions "frequently identified 'civil
society' as a concept helpful in developing strategies of assistance [for democracy]. ...
'Civil society,' it is argued provides a paradigm for conceptualising strategies to create
the preconditions for democracy in transitional nations" (Katz, 2000: 16). Quigley's
research on foundations concluded that key strategies in aiding democracy in eastern
and central Europe after 1989 involved supporting "civil society as the best means
available to [them to assist] democracy" (Quigley, 1997: 104). According to Renz (1998)
US Foundations in the 1990s showed "a renewed interest in the role of civil society vis-
a-vis the state," and while at the same time noting that geopolitical developments in the
last decade had "thrust non governmental, voluntary, and citizen action groups into the
spotlight" (507-508).
Stacey and Aksartova (2001) note that an important lesson stemming directly from
recent transitions to democracy in Latin America and Poland was the crucial role-played
by civil society. Some critics while acknowledging the importance of civil society to
political transition in these regions caution against the uncritical and wholesale embrace
of the benefits of civil society. Earlier critics such as Rousseau (cited in Noumoff 2000)
observed that civil society was "a swindle of the rich designed to remove the threat to
private property by making laws favouring the rich" (3). Current critics charge that the
'liberation of civil society' plays a vital role in the struggle to legitimate the shift in
balance of forces, both internally and globally, and to de-legitimise resistance and
contending options (Beckman 1993). Underlining all this is the rout of communism by
capitalism. As part of a broader project, civil society is seen as no more than a cog in
the neo-Iiberal machine deployed to make the world compliant to capital. For instance
Noumoff (2000) points out that this has been a longstanding United States "drive for
hegemony' (10). He quotes Gramsci from 1934:
Americanisation requires a particular environment, a particular social
structure (or at least a determined intention to create it) and a certain
type of state. This state is the liberal state, not in the state of free-
trade liberalism, or of effective political liberty, but in the more
fundamental sense of free initiative and of economic individualism,
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which with its own means, on the level of civil society, through
historical development, itself arrives at a regime of industrial
concentration and monopoly (Gramsci cited in Noumoff 2000: 10).
Beckman's (1993) essential argument appears to be that the notion of civil society is
part of a more specific attack on the Third World state in addition to the general
pressure of economic globalisation. Beckman (1993) asserts that "the state vs. civil
society' discourse offers an arena for de-legitimation" of the Third World state. He
further charges that civil society is therefore substituted for the 'nation' as the principal
locus of legitimation. From this perspective the civil society vis-a-vis state is an attempt
to weaken or demobilise the nation state to facilitate economic globalisation and elite
nation interests. According to Noumoff (2000) the conceptual boundaries of current civil
society have been established within a liberal paradigm and that "an assertion of
neutrality, notwithstanding, mask[ing]s a drive for total ideological hegemony" (2).
One of the consequences of scepticism about the Third World state's ability to deliver
was the emergence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as key conduits for
developed countries to effect development. Oftentimes this was undertaken without
going through states that not only lacked capacity to do development but also were
often perceived as predatory or not interested in development. But a key lesson from
the early work of donors is that they themselves did not escape some measure of blame
for the ineffectiveness of the African state and the role of aid in general. For instance
multiple conditionalities foisted by donors have also been regarded as key aspects in the
ineffectiveness of aid. Stiglitz (2002) makes a distinction between conditions and
conditionalities. The former refers to a set of basic conditions that increase the
likelihood that the loan will be repaid. The latter "refers to more forceful conditions,
ones that often turn the loan into a policy tool" (Stiglitz 2002:44). The loan is then
disbursed in instalments tied to measurable or verifiable compliance with a particular
policy direction.
This study will look at some aspects of civil society in South Africa. Why South Africa?
South Africa is an important site for a number of reasons. It is seen playing a leading
role especially given President Mbeki's promptings of an African renaissance and more
recently the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) initiative. In addition
South Africa is regarded as strategic for other considerations, for instance in 1995 South
Africa was the second largest African recipient of US aid after Egypt (Hearn 1999).
American philanthropic organisations have similar conclusions. For instance South Africa
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was a major focus of carnegie's civil society and democracy promotion efforts. carnegie
argued that "the demand for democratic governance and participatory societies" in the
rest of Africa was "spurred on by South Africa," and that South Africa's experiences
stimulated it to try "to clarify the requisite conditions for sustaining Africa's emerging
democracies and to encourage democratic reformers (carnergie Corporation 1996:29).
1.2 Problem Statement
Many pressures impact on civil society organisations in their endeavour to influence
public policy. It is not the purpose of this study to attempt a comprehensive account of
South African civil society. It is concerned with but one factor, namely the impact that
donor funding has on the independence and effectiveness of CSOs in post-apartheid
South Africa. The purpose is to probe for an impressionistic understanding of what is
happening in order to contribute to the demystification of the concept and indeed
relevance. This paper will therefore focus on a select group of civil society players. With
regard to donors it will look at United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, a German political foundation. The paper
will explore how these organisations conceive of civil of society with regard to their work
in South Africa. USAID argues that it supports civil society initiatives "because a healthy
and robust civil society is a critical element of the consolidation of South Africa's
emerging democracy, a strategic objective supported by USAID in South Africa" (USAID
2000: 1). Critical to this study USAIlYs New Partnership Initiative declares that it "will
focus significant resources on strengthening civil society and helping to restructure the
relationship between states and civil societies" (cited in Kakarala 2001: 3).
This dissertation impressionistically explores the extent to which donors and the
direction of donor funding has been instrumental in the form that civil society is taking
and coalitions emanating there from. It will pay special attention to priority area setting
by donors and how this apparent agenda setting filters to the work done by civil society
organisations (CSOs). For instance USAID acknowledges that it works with a select
group of CSOs in an attempt to impact public policy. A central focus will be to unravel
how priorities are set particularly with regard to funding of civil society. This research
will employ a case study approach to look at NGOs involved in activities that aim to
influence public policy. The research looks at Chapter 2 Network, which is an
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organisation that provides support for civil society organisations involved in advocacy in
South Africa. This organisation is an arm of Institute for a Democratic Alternative for
South Africa (IDASA), which began as a forum and mediating body for discussions and
negotiations between blacks and whites within South Africa. Chapter 2 Network is a
recipient of USAID support. Following USAID funding the research will also investigate
the Centre for Public Participation (CCP) and the Centre for Civil Society (CCS) at the
University of Natal, Durban. The research will also look, as it attempts a comparative
study of democratisation models, at the direction of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation,
which has an ostensibly different model on civil society. It will look at one of the
Foundation's partners namely the Democracy Development Programme (DDP) that aims
to build capacity in civil society organisations. (www.racism.gov.za/pr/workshop). The
research also takes a look at the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), an
organisation that receives support from both the USAID and the Konrad Adenauer
Foundation. The research looks at South African Non-Governmental Organisation
Coalition (SANGOCO).
1.3 Potential value of the study
Assessments of how selected institutions understand civil society and how they link civil
society to democracy is important because it elucidates and confronts the pressures that
are shaping civil society and democracy in South Africa. Democracy is after all a
contested term. It will pay close attention to who gets funding, why and the kind of
work they are involved in, in all the cases. It will be of value in interrogating the claims
that civil society can act as a bulwark against state oppression or indeed the potential
for state oppression, that civil society can act as democratising agent through assuming
a watchdog role. While it does not make a direct attempt to conceptualise such a civil
society, it does assess the trajectory of South Africa against these broad claims. For
instance Hearn (1999) found while looking at civil society in South Africa, Uganda and
Ghana that civil society organisations committed to promoting liberal democracy and
economic liberalism were the most popular with donors. A tentative attempt will be
made to assess the extent to which donor funded institutions influence state policy vis-
a-vis other civil society institutions.
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1.4 THEORECTICAL FRAMEWORK
As civil society is a contested concept, definitions vary depending on which
characteristics are stressed. According to Anheier and Carlson (2002), "some definitions
primarily focus on aspects of state power, politics and individual freedom, others more
on economic functions and notions of social capital and cohesion" (2). They argue that
civil society has in the 20th century come to be associated with notions of civility,
popular participation and civic mindedness (Verba et al. 1995), the public sphere
(Habermas 1992), social capital (Putman 1993 and 2000; Coleman 1988 and 1990),
culture (Gramsci 1971) and community (Etzioni 1971, 1993).
The complexity of civil society and the many relations and intersections it
has with the economy, the state and institutions like the family, the media or
culture, makes it not only possible but almost necessary to examine the
concepts from different perspectives and orientations. Some analysts adopt
an abstract, systemic view and see civil society as a macro-sociological
attribute of societies, particular in the way state and society relate to each
other. Others take on a more individualistic orientation and emphasise the
notions of individual agency, citizenship, values and participation, using
econometric and social network approaches in analysing civil society. There
is also an institutional approach to study civil society by looking at the size,
scope and structure of organisations and associations, and the functions
they perform (Anheier and Carlson 2002:2).
According to Gramsci (1971) civil society plays a crucial role in the formation of values,
norms and identifications. Civil society does not merely implant or reproduce practices
but it is an arena of social contestation. It is therefore a site of alliances, an arena
where collective identities form and in the case of transitional states such as South
Africa where progress towards nation building is gauged. Cohen (1998) asserts that
twentieth century analysts make a distinction between informal networks and social
movements on one hand and formal voluntary associations, institutions and
organisations such as parties and unions on the other. "Social movements articulate
new social concerns and projects; they generate new values and collective identities. In
struggles over democratisation, they seek to reform not only the polity, but also the
institutions of civil society"
(www.puaf.umd.edu/IPPP/summer98/american civil society).
Following Anheier and Carlson (2002), this dissertation takes the view that the different
perspectives are not necessarily contradictory, "nor are the various approaches to
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understand it necessarily rival; to the contrary, they are often complementary and differ
in emphasis, explanatory focus and policy implication rather than in principle" (2)
Key Theoretical Concepts
Hegemony
Hegemony is a Greek term that originally referred to the power of a single state over
others. Litowitz (2000) contends that this understanding of the term prevailed
throughout the centuries, for instance, to describe the power of Prussia over various
German states or the power of France over its colonies. Marx and Engels used the term
in the same sense. The concept has over time been broadened to describe the
ideological power of a particular class or classes over other classes in a given society
and/or across nation states. Apposite to this study, it also describes the dominance of
northern donors over the CSOs, which are recipients of funding from these donors.
Piven and Cloward (1977) argue that historical experience and commonsense point to
clear sources of power in a given society. They argue that those who "control the
means of physical coercion, and those who control the means of producing wealth, have
power over those who do not" (1). They continue:
Since coercive force can be used to gain control of the means of
producing wealth, and since control of wealth can be used to gain
coercive force, these two sources of power tend over time to be drawn
together within one ruling class (Piven and Cloward: 1977
Gramsci (1971) argued that social control requires power at twb levels namely coercion
and consent. In his view, coercion refers to the ability of a state to ensure compliance
due to monopoly control of the police, the army and other coercive instruments at its
disposal. Consent describes the ability of dominant classes to persuade subordinate
classes to "accept, adopt and interiorise the values and norms which dominant groups
themselves have adopted and believe to be right and proper" (Miliband 1990: 346).
Miliband (1990) sees this as the strong meaning of "hegemony-as-consent". The core
argument is that the power of a social group is maintained not only by forced
compliance but by also taking control of civil society - "the vast network of contacts,
associations, families, churches, and informal gatherings in which people move from day
to day without direct involvement from the state" (Litowitz 2000:523).
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[T]he 'spontaneous consent' given by the great masses of the population
to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant group;
this consent is "historically caused" by the prestige (and consequent
confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position
and function in the world of production (Gramsci 1971: 12).
Under such a situation domination does not merely reside in the state but is manifested
in popular imagination, the education system, the work of intellectuals, religion and the
arts. For Gramsci (1971) the "the foundation of a directive class [class dirigente] (Le of
a State) is equivalent to the creation of a Weltanschauung," (381) a dominant
worldview. According to Piven and Cloward (1977), as this superstructure of beliefs and
rituals develops within a patently unequal context, "it is inevitable that beliefs and rituals
reinforce inequality, by rendering the powerful divine and the challengers evil" (1).
Critical for this study, Litowitz (2000) asserts that it "stands to reason that the decline in
physical force is related to the increasing use of persuasion and conformity as
mechanism of social orderlll (524). Put another way: When domination is internalised
and naturalised, the need for external coercion falls away.
The establishment of a dominant worldview requires instruments of universalisation,
naturalisation and rationalisation. With universalisation, the dominant group is
successful in portraying sectarian interests as the common or national interests of all
people (Gramsci cited in Litowitz 2000). By naturalism, a certain way to life becomes
'reified'to a point where 'culture' is equated with 'nature'. According to Litowitz (2000),
this induces a "quietism because there is no point in fighting against nature" (526).
According to Miliband (1990), consent can also be seen in the capacity of dominant
classes to persuade subordinate classes that:
whatever they might think of the prevailing social order, and however
alienated they might be from it, any alternative would be
catastrophically worse, and that in any case there was nothing much
that they could do to bring about any such alternative (Miliband 1990:
346).
Coupled together, these processes consolidate a particular social order. In the strategy
of rationalisation, Gramsci (1971) argues that every ruling group gives rise to an
intellectual class that perpetuates the existing way of life. Even before this longer-term
process takes effect, hegemony is constantly being reinforced for it can never be
irreversibly guaranteed. According to Miliband (1990), "it is something that needs to be
8
constantly nurtured, defended and reformulated". This paper argues that the notion of
civil society must be understood in this light: namely, as a continuation of these
processes in order to ensure acquiescence of South African society. In other words, the
dissertation argues that northern donors use their control over financial resources to
disproportionately influence the agenda of CSOs in South Africa. In that process the
militancy or progressive components of the initial programs proposed by some CSOs are
lost in attempts to secure funding, to become electable to donors. In this way, these
donors are able to fashion CSOs in their own image, and wittingly or unwittingly these
end up implementing programs/projects strongly influenced by these donors. Hence the
charge: most CSOs have become implementing agencies for neo-Iiberal projects. This is
not to say that civil society organisations cannot extend democratic space or to say that
civil society cannot articulate certain forms of state oppression. They can perform all
these functions, in a piecemeal fashion, as individual organisations. But taken as a
totality, this by no means, the overarching intention of civil society particularly when
viewed against the background of profound resource weakness. For instance, as Piven
and C10ward (1977) point out that only under exceptional conditions "are the lower
classes afforded the socially determined opportunity to press for their own interests"
(7). They contend further that theorists of various persuasions agree that extraordinary
disturbances in the larger society are required to move poor or marginalized people to
action. "And with that said, the implication for an understanding of the potential for
political influence among the poor becomes virtually self-evident: since periods of
profound social dislocations are infrequent, so too are the opportunities for protest
among the lower classesN(Piven and Cloward 1977: 14). For South Africa, this has far-
reaching consequences. At the root of this inequality lies an apartheid social structure
that consisted of "a process of state-driven underdevelopment that encompassed
dispossession and exclusion for the majority of South Africans" (May et al 1999).
Bornstein (2000) contends that this resulted in "an institutional framework that worked
to the advantage of whites, men, people in urban areas, and established industrial
interests" (174). In summary, May et al (1999) argue that the legislation and institutions
through which this ideology was implemented operated to produce persistent and
extreme inequality. Even though constitutional apartheid has ended, its structures
continue to frame the perpetuation of inequality. It is against this background that the
impact of civil society must be analysed.
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Legitimacy
The online Dictionary (http://dictionary.com) lists seven possible meanings for the word
'legitimate', three of which are relevant to this study. These are being exactly as
purposed, that is authentic and genuine neither sham nor false. Secondly conforming to
recognised principles or accepted rules and standards and thirdly being in accord with
the law or with established legal forms. Therefore, an organisation can be said to enjoy
legitimacy when it exhibits the following: that it is exactly what it claims to be, that it
conforms to some accepted standard and that it is legal. According to Habermas (1975)
legitimation refers to the general sense on the part of the citizens that the institutions
that govern them are just, good and deserving of support and adherence.
Habermas (1975) contends that legitimacy is essential otherwise institutions or indeed
society falls into crisis. For instance, when an economy fails to create opportunities for
citizens to compete, to have jobs, to educate their children, and so on, Habermas
(1975) believes that there is a crisis. As a consequence, the legitimation of social
institutions is questionable. For Habermas (1975), the source of this legitimacy crisis
arises when communicative action has been colonised by a particular discourse, or
particular interests. While Habermas (1975) believes that societies need integration, he
also recognises that they are in crisis, because - as advanced capitalism has taken hold -
the integrative function of communication has increasingly faltered. Habermas (1975)
identifies two types of media in the communication process that are crucial to this
study. He recognises a quantitative part made up of money and power (specified in
votes) that has become dominant. "Rather than communicative action - people talking
about their differences and coming to a common understanding - one (person, party, or
interest) dominates the other by having money or votes"
(www.ucalgary.ca/lVfrank/habermas). Specific to this study, it can be argued that the
influence of donors constitutes a crisis of legitimacy for civil society. Also crucial to this
study, Habermas (1975) argues that the quantitative part requires legitimacy, which can
only be attained through the qualitative media consisting of communications between
individuals and groups. This study will argue that by determining the agenda within civil
society through a large pool of resources, donors are also impacting on the qualitative
end through shaping the deployment of those resources.
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Accountability
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) inclusive of civil society organisations (CSOs)
are often said to have multiple accountabilities. According to Edwards and Hulme
(1995), functional accountability refers to financial resources employed during a project
cycle and is therefore easily quantifiable. Due to this quality, donors tend to rely heavily
on this type of accountability. Strategic accountability, which is considerably more
difficult to measure, relies on subjectively defined factors (Edwards and Hulme, 1995).
Partnerships
Partnerships are seen as a way to improve the effectiveness of aid and assuring a more
equal relationship (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1998). Historically, money has been equated with
power and a belief on the part of Western governments and non-governmental
organisations that their mission is to develop those who suffer the effects of
underdevelopment. There has been a significant shift in thinking at least at the level of
rhetoric. The World Bank (1999) believes that partnerships should be entered into with
the specific objective of assuring or improving local 'ownership'. According to Fowler
(1996), while donors acknowledge the importance of partnership, the current debate
has not delivered on substance.
Participation
Participation refers to the involvement of stakeholders in a process. These activities can
take place at various stages, for instance project conception, formulation and
implementation. Because donors control financial resources they can often delineate
CSO participation through making available money for certain activities, programmes or
projects. While NGOs can take part at different stages, substantive participation takes
place when involvement occurs at all stages. Reliance on one donor can seriously
compromise organisational independence. Multiple accountabilities to more than one
donor and other stakeholders can mitigate the impact of control by one dominant
partner (Edwards and Hulme 1996).
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1.5 Research Questions
The specific objectives of this research are:
a) To examine the extent to which the availability of donor funds,
programme focus and donor coordination act to channel and corral civil society
in particular directions. This is intended to answer questions such as: How did
these institutions understand civil society, what form did they think was
important for democracy and how did they see South Africa's evolving society?
Further, how was this operationalised?
b) To examine donor perceptions with regard to CSO participation in the
formulation of local projects they fund. In other words, how significant are CSOs
beyond acting as implementing agencies for donors?
c) Did these institutions favour professionalised CSOs over grassroots and
decentralised organisations, and if so, was this the right approach?
1.6 Chapter Outline
The dissertation is organised into six chapters. This chapter spells out the research
problem, key theoretical concepts, research questions and the method used in the field
research. Chapter Two looks at research methodology and the justification for choice of
research method. Chapter Three reviews the literature, examines in considerable depth
the history, ideological underpinning of various approaches to civil society and attempts
an evaluation of these perspectives. It will also explore the arrival of civil society as the
'hegemonic project' (Beckman 1993) of our time. Chapter Four presents the individual
case studies, Chapter 2 Network, Democracy Development Programme (DDPJ Centre
for Public Participation (CCP), Centre for Civil Society (CCS), Electoral Institute of
Southern Africa (EISA), South African Non-Governmental Organisation Coalition
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(SANGOCO), Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and USAID. In each case, a brief history of the
organisation is given in order to situate it in South African civil society. Chapter Five
provides analysis of the experiences of the various organisations. It will also present and
interpret the findings of the analysis, including whether this research revealed a
relationship between factors such as areas of donor focus and the issues pursued by
civil society organisations. Also discussed is whether the research suggests different
approaches to assisting civil society organisations.
Finally, the conclusion will evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the findings and
will include an assessment of both the internal and external validity of this study. It will
also explain to what extent my research questions were answered. An attempt will be
made to compare the findings to those of earlier studies. A supposition is made that
donors are exerting significant influence on civil society organisations seeking to impact
public policy in South Africa. This is happening through setting the agenda in terms of
what civil society activities are funded. The research will also argue that civil society
organisations are more accountable to donors than to other stakeholders. The study will





This chapter explains the relevant methodological considerations. It details the chosen
data collection and analytical tools, brings to the fore the ethical issues and discusses
the study's limitations.
2.1 Research Methodology
The study employs qualitative methods, which according to Maier et al (1994) can be
understood as open procedures, "trying to determine 'what exists' and 'why it exists'
rather 'how much of is there'" (3). In addition qualitative approaches describe "undefined
and open situation[s], where knowledge about the problem has to be explored first" while
quantitative methods on the other hand require a defined problem. It is apparent that civil
society in South Africa falls more into the undefined and open situation. Maier et al (1994)
see three types of qualitative techniques namely interviews, observation and interactive/
projective techniques. This study applies the interview method. The principal methodology
comprised of key informant interviews with four organisations, 2 donor agencies and 2
civil society organisations. Documents were collected from all these sources and reviewed.
2.2 Choice of Method: Justification
The research employs the interview as an information gathering technique but selection
of organisations follows the case study approach. Robson (1993) defines a case study
as "a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of
evidence" (147). The case study approach is appropriate for this study for a number of
reasons. The first, is that case studies can be pre-structured or 'emergent'. Secondly as
the study is an exploratory one, Le seeking to "get some feeling as to what is going on
in novel situation (civil society) where there is little to gUide what one should be looking
for" (Robson 1993: 149) a tight pre-structure may straitjack the study and result in
unreliable findings.
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But this is not without problems, for instance Robson (1993) notes a dilemma between
looseness and selectivity. For instance he argues that the looser the original design, the
less selective you can afford to be in data selection. "On the other hand, the danger is
that if you start with a strong conceptual framework, this will blind you to important
features of the case, or cause you to misinterpret evidence" (Robson 1993:149). While
noting the existence of this dilemma this study has sought to employ the pre-structured
approach due to considerations of time and findings from earlier studies.
2.3 Sampling strategy
In general qualitative research uses a purposive sampling method. Purposive sampling
involves selection of informants based on an important characteristic under study, such
as where they live (rural or urban), position in society (for instance community leaders
or ordinary citizens), or specific cultural knowledge (traditional leaders, farmers).
According to Robson (1993) the principle of selection in this method of sampling is the
researcher's judgment as to 'typicality or interest'. "A sample is built up which enables
the researcher to satisfy her specific needs in a project" (Robson 1993:141). Robson
(1993) also notes that this is an approach commonly used within case studies.
Participants were selected from civil society organisations working in cape Town,
Pretoria, Johannesburg and Durban. It was the intention of the study that the
participants come from diverse backgrounds representing a broad spectrum of
ideological positions. In addition the participants were chosen due to their positions
within their organisations and because they can provide information and knowledge that
cannot be found elsewhere. Kumar et al (1993) assert that key informants are able and
willing to communicate their knowledge. According to Borg and Gall (1989), using the
key-informant approach has many advantages. Key-informants can "provide insights
that no amount of observation would reveal. They can also provide insights into
processes, sensitize the researcher to value dilemmas, and help the researcher see the
implications of specific findings" (p. 399). While a concerted effort was made to obtain a
diverse sample of civil society leaders, the sampling obtained is however not statistically
random. It is important to point out this was never the intention of the study.
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2.4 selection of Data Collection Techniques
According to Robson (1993), the conceptual framework adopted, the research questions
and sampling chosen determine the approach to data collection. The study employed
the interview as the best technique for data collection. Maykut and Morehouse (1994)
regard an interview as a conversation with a purpose. Mishler (1986) however makes a
distinction between a standard interview and a qualitative research interview:
At its heart is the proposition that an interview is a form of discourse. Its particular
features reflect the distinctive structure and aims of interviewing, namely, that it is
discourse shaped and organised by asking and answering questions. An interivew is a
joint product of what interviewees and interviewers talk about together and how they
talk with each other. The record of an interview that we researchers make and then use
in our work of analysis and interpretation is a representation of that talk (Mishler 1986)
According to Robson (1993), face-to-face interviews offer the possibility of modifying
one's line of enquiry, in a way that other techniques such as questionnaires cannot. This
is an important point for this study which is essentially an exploration of the evolving
civil society terrain in South Africa. But it is not without significant problems. For
instance Robson (1993) points out that "interactions between interviewer and
interviewee can also be influential; differences or similarities in class, ethnic origin,
gender, age and status can affect rapport and the extent to which the interviewee seeks
to please, or reacts against, the interviewer" (237). Selection bias was introduced by the
targeting of particular key informants. Consequently these findings are not statistically
generalizable for the entirety of South African civil society. While in general the absence
of standardisation inevitably raises concerns about reliability, biases, considerable skill
and experience on the part of the interviewer can allay some of these fears argues
Robson (1993). But it is also important to underline the advantages of the approach
such as the in-depth nature of the assessment using qualitative methodology. Most of
the demerits of the approach were mitigated by the fact that the interviewer is a











(Adapted from Maier et al (1994).
Hard Facts
Simple
The study used a combination of opened-ended interviews, focused interview and
structured interview. Here follows a description of the main features of these
techniques:
• Open-ended interview. No pre-specified set or order of questions; little or no
direction from interviewer; goal typically to gain insight into a person's
perceptions in a situation (Robson 1993). According to Maykut and Morehouse
(1994), the researcher "tactfully asks and actively listens in order to understand
what is important about the setting and the experiences of people in that
setting" (81). The researcher asks questions pertinent to the study as
opportunities arise, listens closely to the informants responses for clues as to
what questions to ask next, or whether it is important to probe for additional
information. Bogdan and Biklen (cited in Maykut and Morehouse 1994) contend
that interviews are particularly important when one is interested in gaining
participant perspectives, the language and meanings constructed by individuals.
Using work done by Perry titled Forms ofIntellectual and Ethical Development in
College Years as an illustration, Maykut and Morehouse (1994) argue that using
a single open-ended question and then relying on good interviewing skills to
elaborate and extend the contents of each interview can illuminate thinking and
purpose.
• Focused interview. Use of interview guide specifying key topics; order of
questions not fixed. According to Merton et al (cited in Robson 1993) a focused
interview is an approach which allows people's views and feelings to emerge, but
which gives the interviewer some control. Patton (1990) sees an interview guide,
an important tool using this techique, consisting of a series of topics or broad
interview questions which the researcher is free to explore and probe with the
interviewee. Maykut and Morehouse (1994) contend that an interview format
consisting of a detailed set of questions and probes is called an interview
schedule. Having noted these differences Maykut and Morehouse 1994) point
out that in the actual interview situation, the skilled researcher will discover that
what is important to the interviewees, within the broad boundaries of the
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•
interview topics and questions, and pursue these new discoveries in the
interview.
Srudured interview. Standardized set of questions (Robson 1993). Robson
(1993) argues that the structured interview is not dissimilar to a questionnaire,
"the procedural difference is of course that while the respondent fills in the
questionnaire, the interviewer completes the interview schedule" (236). This
enables a direct comparision and makes easier quantification of the findings. But
a significant weakness of this approach is that it is insufficiently flexible and has
potential of producing irrelevant results.
The unstructured approach is highly suited for adaptation depending on the
personalities of the key informants. A key informant interview unravels in much the
same way as a dialogue. Open-ended questions are asked and the interviewer makes a
concerted effort to build rapport. While the unstructured interview has the potential to
leave out certain issues that may not arise during the course of interview, an interview
guide can overcome this. An interview guide is essentially an outline of the topics to be
discussed. It is important to stress that it is not necessary to follow the guide as long as
the issues contained are discussed in the interview. It is usual for the interviewer to
explore relevant issues as they come up.
Four in-depth interviews were carried out with 4 key informants. Civil society leaders
were chosen using advocacy profile as a main selection criterion. This is because the
study has taken a civil society organisation as one that seeks to affect the conduct of
public policy. Informants were also chosen from referrals (a form of snowball sampling
procedure) made during the interviews.
Survey questions were designed in such a way that they elicit information regarding the
advocacy work and the ideological underpinnings of that work.Another reason why this
technique was chosen, is that it allows for a flexible and iterative approach. Flexibility
was built in inorder to investigate each participant's statements and to probe issues
related to the study but which were absent from the interview guide. Permission was
also sought from the participants to record interviews. In addition extensive notes were
taken during each interview. Interviews were planned to last between one to two hours.
The interview data was then transcribed verbatim. The data were then content-
analyzed. Content analysis is a research technique for systematically examining the
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content of communications (Denscombe 1998). At the same time "quite independently
of what the writer had consciously intended, the text carries some clues about a deeper
rooted and possibly unintentional message that is actually being communicated"
(Descombe 1998: 168). According to Robson (1996) content analysis has three main
advantages. He notes that it is an unobtrusive measure, that the data is in a 'permanent
form' and hence can be subject to re-analysis and thirdly it provides a low cost form of
longitudinal analysis "when a 'run' or series of documents of a particular type is
available" (280). Robson lists the limitation or partiality of available documents (for
instance, in this case the chosen interviewees), that documents have been written for
another purpose (which is not relevant as the material was collected specifically for this
study) and as with "other non-experimental approaches, it is very difficult to assess
causal relationships" (280).
Data were read and put together and filed according to the topic or issue addressed.
Responses were analyzed thematically with emergent themes ranked by how frequent
they were mentioned and subsequently categorized. The content analysis of the
interview data was completed manually.
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2.5 Ethical considerations
The following ethical issues have been considered in this study:
•
•
Acknowledgement of sources of information: All sources of information have
been duly acknowledged.
Dissemmination of information: the dissertation will be made available in the
library of the University of Natal. I may publish relevant aspects of the research
in scientific and/or professional journals. All participants of the study will be
informed, and on request, a copy of the article will be made available
2.6 Limitation of the study
This dissertation lacks generalisability. For instance, while mindful of common
considerations, the participants are not representative. If a decision had been made to
interview other civil society organisations other than the ones interviewed the issues
may have taken a different trajectory. Again, no attempt has been made to interview a
cross section of civil society organisations that have a financial relationship with donors;
the choice of organisations has been selective. Having said this, with qualitative
research of this nature, the inability to generalise does not constitute an overwhelming
limitation. The researcher does not make a claim to widespread generalisation of this
study's findings.
Concerning reliability, the researcher has ensured accuracy and objectivity by recording
and verbatim transcription of interviews. Where possible the statements of participants
are presented unchanged in the discussion of findings. However as the interpretations
are those of the researcher, they cannot be neutral.
The main limitation of the study relates to the role of the researcher. The dissertation
relied on the researcher as the tool for data collection. As noted elsewhere the author
brings particular experiences and influences that frame a particular 'reality'. It is
reasonable to speculate that a different author may have created a different reality, a
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different study. Put another way this study makes no claim to be objective. It is
inherently subjective.
This following chapter lays out the historical background to notions of civil society. It
focuses on the evolution of civil society as a concept.
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY, CONTENDING POSITIONS AND STATE
CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONS
This chapter provides a review of the literature on the emergence of civil society as an
organising principle. It deals with the broad question of what makes up civil society's
constituting elements, its purpose, its role and the changing way it has been understood
over the centuries. It will also look at how all these aspects altered with changing
contexts. In conclusion following the example of Hearn (1999), it argues that while civil
society means different things to different people, the organisations that are central,
and therefore crucial to this dissertation, are those that seek to influence public policy.
The research therefore takes the view that civil society organisations are those
organisations aiming to influence public policy.
3.1 Civil Society: Historical background
According to Wood (1990), there is a long standing intellectual tradition in the West
extending back to classical antiquity, "which has in various ways delineated a terrain of
human association, some notion of 'society', distinct from the body politic and with
moral claims independent of, and sometimes opposed to, the state's authority" (61).
Glasius (2001) echoes this when she notes that the notion has direct equivalents in
Latin and Greek. The Centre for Civil Society (CCS) at the London School ofEconomics
argues that the most comprehensive account of the notion is by the Scotsman Adam
Ferguson, in An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1995) who wrote in the 18th
century. According to Glasius (2001), the book attempts to resurrect the Roman ideal of
civic duty. "In order to have a civil society, men (not women, of course, that age)
needed to take an active interest in the government of their polity, instead of simply
accumulating wealth and diverting themselves"
(www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/ccs/pdf/Glasiusbriefingl).This notion clearly resonates with the
present use of the term. Under the highly influential classical work Leviathan (1990) by
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Thomas Hobbes, "it was generally thought that in primitive societies, men were
constantly competing and trying to kill each other over food, possessions or women. It
was thought that 'savages' had no forms of social organisation".
(www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/ccs/pdf/Glasius briefing1). It can be argued that attempts to
introduce and nurture civil society in developing countries is informed by remnants of
these notions.
In a significant shift, Glasius (2001) points out that Hegel perceived of civil society as
'society minus the state'. It is important to note that it included what is now termed the
economy. After all, civil society consisted of men trading and interacting socially. Wood
(1990) notes this origin arguing that the current usage of civil society and its conceptual
opposition to the state "has been inextricably associated with the development of
capitalism" (60). Habermas (1985) observes that Hegel was the first to separate the
political sphere of the state from civil society. Anheier and Carlson (2002) assert that
the growth of ideas such as civil society marked the broad decline of status based social
order. Hegel (cited in Glasius 2001) also viewed civil society as an arena of
contradictions and that these contradictions could only be reconciled by the state in its
capacity as the custodian of the highest ethical ideals of society. Following from Hegel's
work, Marx saw civil society as a sphere of conflicts between competing private
interests. To Marx, these conflicts took the form of class struggles and the state could
become a victim of these conflicts. Marx had "a very negative view of civil society",
seeing in its German translation, 'Buergerliche Gesellschaft', as bourgeois society, and
narrowed it to only economic life in which everyone pursues his own interests"
(www.lse.ac.uklDepts/ccs/pdf/Glasius briefing1).
3.2 Civil Society: New Perspectives
The notion of civil society is highly contested. Van Rooy (1997) contends that the term
civil society has a long history in political philosophy and that its definition has "altered
with Roman, Liberal, Hegelian, Marxist, Gramscian and post-modern interpretations long
before it was resurrected in the 1990s" (5). But what is clear, according to Beckman
(1993), is that "a range of political forces across the political spectrum think that civil
society has been constrained by the state and needs to be liberated" (20). Given that
civil society is said to occupy the space between the family and the state, this
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contestation is understandable. For instance, the Centre for Civil Society at the London
School ofEconomics (2001) defines civil society as the set of institutions, organisations
and behaviours situated between the state, the business world, and the family" (CCS
2001: 4). However, it cautions that this is not without controversy. Riddell and
Bebbington (1997) note that civil society is a 'notoriously slippery concept', while Hearn
(1999) has observed considerable debate about the meaning of civil society.
Broadly, there are three approaches to analysing civil society: firstly, the Marxist
approach; secondly, the liberal or neo-Iiberal or the liberal pluralist approach anchored
by Tocqueville and Putnam; and thirdly, the Habermasian tradition. Looking specifically
at non-governmental organisations, Salamon and Anheier (1998) distinguish between
four non-profit regimes: the liberal, the social democratic, the corporatist and the
statist. However, they caution that these categories are only heuristic devices intended
to demarcate broad tendencies.
Critical to the manner in which the notion is viewed today, Gramsci (1971) divorced civil
society from economic interaction. He argued that civil society stands between the
economic structure and the state with its legislation and coercion (Gramsci, 1971).
Gramsci (1971) saw civil society consisting of cultural institutions, such as the church,
schools, associations and trade unions. It is probable that the present day contestations
about the notion originate with Gramsci. To begin with, Gramsci (1971) was ambiguous.
"On one hand, it is through this 'cultural superstructure' that the bourgeois class
imposes its hegemony, using it to keep the working class in its place. On the other
hand, it is a kind of wedge between the state and the class-structured economy, which
has the revolutionary potential of dislodging the bourgeoisie."
(www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/ccs/pdf/Glasiusbriefing1).This complexity arises out of the fact
that the "dominant group must concede to the needs of other groups so that their
interests are aligned, and at the same time it must promote its parochial interests as
representative of the interests of all social groups" (Litowitz 2000:522).
Gramsci (1971) noted that people exploited by capitalism and in his time by Italian
fascism, were often the strongest supporters of capitalism and fascism and that they
willingly consented to their own exploitation. In attempting to account for this situation,
according to Litowitz (2000) Gramsci came to believe that the dominant group "was able
to disseminate its values in churches, schools, and popular culture, which meant that
physical force was only one aspect of domination, the other being persuasion, or
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leadership, which always entails some form of voluntariness" (522). In this perspective,
domination is a considerably more nuanced phenomenon than previously expounded by
Marxists who focussed exclusively on the factory and the parliament as the locus of
oppression (Buci-Glucksmann cited in Litowitz 2000).
For Gramsci, domination becomes encoded at all levels of a system,
resulting in a kind of multilevel homeostasis where a dominant group (or
a particular class of people) controls the repressive power of the police
force as well as the intellectual means of production, namely the
schools, news media, entertainment, and other mechanisms for the
molding of popular culture... domination requires the establishment of an
entire way of life as standard and expected, the identification of the
dominated with the dominators and the subtle establishment of the
prevailing ideology as natural and inevitable, indeed commonsensical.
When domination reaches the internal world of the actors, resistance is
almost unthinkable (Litowitz 2000:528).
Gramsci (1971) developed a theory of political change based on his conception of civil
society. Drawing contrast between Russia and the West, he argues that civil society was
inchoate in the former. While "the state was everything, civil society was primordial and
gelatinous" (Gramsci cited in Morera 1990: 163). Gramsci (1971) further contends that
this had allowed for a direct violent assault on the state as in Russia in 1917. On the
other hand, Gramsci (1971) argues that in the West civil society was strong and this
strategy would be unworkable. For Gramsci, (1971) institutions of civil society formed
the 'outer earthworks' of the state, instruments through which the ruling classes
maintained their hegemony over the rest of society. In looking at his own country, Italy
in the 1870s, Gramsci (1971) acknowledged that there was indeed a separation
between state and civil society but because civil society was 'something amorphous and
chaotic' it was possible for the state to dominate it. Transformation of civil society was
therefore necessary to create an alternative hegemony of the subordinate classes in
order to challenge the state.
In his hegemonic theory of civil society, Gramsci (1971) viewed transformation as both
a cultural and political process and saw a central role for intellectuals. Gramsci (1971)
argues that while each class developed its own intellectuals, these groups contributed to
maintaining the existing hegemony. Gramsci (1971) asserted that a counter hegemony
of the working class would reqUire its own organic intellectuals and beliefs.
Marxist theorists such as Gramsci (1971) identify civil society as an important arena for
mobilizing the exploited and dominated classes. It is important for a number of reasons.
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According to Morera (1990), Gramsci suggests that hegemony is a permanent feature in
all societies - "that is, that no society exists without a certain degree of hegemony,
however slight that degree may be" (Morera 1990: 162). Gramsci (cited in Morera 1990)
perceived that public opinion, which "is closely connected with political hegemony
inasmuch as it is "the point of contact between 'civil society' and 'political society', has
always existed" (162). It is important to note that Gramsci presupposed a capitalist
order. Morera (1990) takes up the point further:
This being so, one must conclude that the difference between modern capitalist
societies and other societies is not the existence of civil society and hegemony in the
former, and their absence in the latter; rather, the difference is in the degree of
development of the institutions of civil society and hegemony...Perhaps this is
applicable to the development of the modern state; the proliferation of the private
institutions of civil society, and the corresponding growth of the dependence of
hegemony on these private organisations, results in qualitative change. (Morera
1990:162)
While acknowledging the possibility of the existence of tremendous coercive state
power, Gramsci (1971) argues that even such a state could lose legitimacy when
challenged by a counter hegemony. While there resides in the state coercive power
based on the use of monopolized violence as an instrument of class domination by the
ruling class, civil society is an arena of moral and cultural hegemony. This is a crucial
point for this study, which it will return to.
Van Roy (1997) contends that the liberal pluralist version presumes a market capitalist
system and a legitimate constitutional order in which the state acts to balance the
varied contending interests articulated by civil society. Civil society is taken to be plural,
diverse and represents various interests. While issues of power incongruencies may
arise they are not taken to be overwhelming. The essence of the liberal understanding
of civil society is that civil society is a sphere of private life independent of the state and
serves to limit the intrusive exercise of political power. Salamon and Anheier (1998)
assert that in practice the liberal regime is characterised by low government spending
on social development while the non-profit sector or civil society is well developed and
privately funded. For Tocqueville (1994), an important thinker in this tradition, voluntary
associations are necessary for developing alternatives in dealing with issues of common
good problems and curbing unbridled political (governmental) power. Janover (1998)
also argues that the growth and development of civil associations provides safeguards
for checking political despotism.
26
In the Habermasian approach, civil society is divorced from both the state and the
market (Cohen and Arato 1992). Habermas (1989) uses the concepts of public sphere
and "lifeworld". According to Habermas (1992: 443), the core of civil society is made up
of nongovernmental and non-economic constellations and voluntary groups that
underpin the communication structures of the public sphere in the society component of
the "Iifeworld". Historically, Habermas (1989) asserts, the public sphere developed in
contrast to the private sphere due to the demise of the feudal order and the growth of
the nation state, commerce and middle class. While the public sphere began in 'salons'
and 'coffeehouses', it has dispersed to mass media such as journals and newspapers
(Habermas: 1989). According to this conception, civil society consists "more or less of
spontaneously created associations, organizations and movements, which find, take up,
condense and amplify the resonance of social problems in private life, and pass it on to
the political realm or public sphere" (Habermas 1992: 443).
It is apparent that the public sphere is an important arena for democracy because it is
there were important public debates can take place. Cohen (1998) defines the public
sphere as an spaces within which people discuss issues of mutual concern and
exchange perspectives. These exchanges occur in different spaces therefore it is
possible to speak of multiple "public spheres" or "civil publics". Cohen (1998) says there
is a larger public sphere that creates balance between the various mini-publics that
emerge within and among organisations of citizens, and informal social networks in the
formation of public opinion
According to Habermas (1989), the public sphere is an important arena for modern
society, because of the presence of what he terms a 'bifurcated 'Iifeworld." Habermas
takes "lifeworld" to mean the shared common understanding, including values, which
develop through face-to-face interaction over time and in various groups. In the
"lifeworld" resides what a people or peoples believe in, morals and norms, what they
aspire to, what they sacrifice, what they won't sacrifice and so on. Therefore the
establishment of an active civil society, in which common will and collective decision can
be reached is a necessary measure to deal with this situation. For Charney (1998), the
public sphere is separate from the apparatus of the state and economy. He asserts that
it is where citizens freely debate, deliberate, and engage in collective democratic will
formation. He further charges that it is here where one finds and understands the
opinions of constituents' opinion and the service claims that people make to
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government. This public opinion, arrived at by discourse, can ordinarily be expected to
have an impact on the debates in state institutions such as parliament and the courts.
The extent of openness of access and level of participation of ordinary citizens is an
important cornerstone of any political dispensation claiming democratic legitimacy.
According to Cohen (1998), it should be the right of all citizens affected by public policy
and laws to articulate their views on an equal basis. Under the Habermasian approach,
the concept of the public sphere is the normative anchor of the idea of civil society and
sits at the centre of Western conceptions of liberal democracy.
Using Habermas' work, Cohen and Arato (1992) propose a three-part framework for
understanding civil society. They employ the concept of 'Iifeworld' to delineate the
extent of civil society. To Cohen and Arato (1992) the concept of communicative action
is critical to the rationalisation of the 'lifeworld'. Communicative action is perceived as an
exchange of subjective experiences which then leads players (various people or groups
of people) to re-interpret norms, coordinate their interaction and reach common ground.
Leet (1998) asserts that Habermas views this as a channel through which consensus
can be achieved sustained and renewed. It is an area of critical importance, which must
function adequately if society is not going to fall into crisis or de-legitimacy.
Postmodernists such as Lyotard (1987) see the current world as a pastiche of fragments
and difference. "The systematic unity of capitalism, its 'objective structures' and
totalising imperatives, have given way (if they ever existed) to a bricolage of multiple
social realities, a pluralistic structure so diverse and flexible that it can rearranged by
discursive construction" (Wood 1990: 60). According to Docker (1994), in the post-
modern age "we no longer have a positivistic science that claims to know the truth;
rather science [ ... ] now tells stories, competing stories [...] We no longer see society as
a uniform whole" (109). Postmodernism contends that the traditional capitalist system
has been replaced by a post-Fordist fragmentation, where every fragment creates
openings for emancipatory struggles. Crucially, the constitutive class relations of
capitalism are said to represent only "one personal 'identity' among many others, no
longer 'privileged' by its historical centrality" (Wood 1990: 60). Marxism is dismissed as
a theory of "an outdated industrial society, for Marxism postulated society as working
only on a duality, a single difference, as between labour and capital" (109). Within the
post-modern perspective, it can be advanced that civil society is located in many
fragments engaging in struggles to promote particular interests. The existence of these
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pockets of struggles is one of the defining features of postmodernism. Wood (1990), a
critic of postmodernism, contends that despite the enormity of diversity of current
theoretical trends on the left, "they often share one especially serviceable concept: 'civil
society'" (60).
According to Swilling and Russell (2002), the liberal regime arises when there is a
strong, ascendant faced with weak or unthreatening landed elites and/or working class
movements. "Private support for social development via NPO (not for profit
organisations) is preferred to using the state for this purpose" (Swilling and Russell
2002: 66). Under a social democratic dispensation the NPO sector does not have a
service provision role as the state is engaged in extensive social development. Swilling
and Russell (2002) assert that a Keynesian economic perspective underpins this while
the NPO sector is relatively weak. The corporatist regime is characterised by extensive
state expenditure on social development, but in league with segments of the NPO
sector. "NPOs act as the conduits for delivering services, in place or in partnership with
state agencies" (Swilling and Russell 2002: 66). Swilling and Russell (2002) argue that
this dispensation comes about when elites in control of the state must accommodate
other elites and classes whose power resides in well-organised, non-profit structures
(civil society institutions). The duo also point out that this rapprochement often comes
about as a result of an attempt to counter greater threats from more radical anti-
capitalist social movements. Salamon and Anheier (cited in Swilling and Russell 2002)
see a fourth regime, the statist. This state of affairs is characterised by low levels of
state support for social development without the hoped for development of non-profit
sector with significant capacity to substitute for the state's neglect.
This regime emerges when economic or self-serving political elites gain control of
the state and face no pressure or obligation to support social development, either via
the state or privately via a philanthropic middle class. Movements of poor and
working people will have either been repressed or systematically disorganised for
various ideological or cultural reasons (Swilling and Russell 2002: 66).
Swilling and Russell (2002) add to Salamon and Anheier's typology of state-civil society
relations a fifth regime, the colonial. Under this order there is limited social spending by
the state and an autonomous non-profit sector subsisting in the colonised people based
on survival and opposition. Social formations would include the external colonial power
allied to a settler class in control of state power, the politically disenfranchised
indigenous middle class, working class and peasantry. According to Swilling and Russell
(2002) as urbanisation and industrialisation takes place, "a politically aspirant urbanised
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(nationalist) middle class is generated" (67). The result is that these oppressed classes
led by middle class elites mount oppositional movements through civil society
organisations (NPOs/CSOs) to seize state power (Swilling and Russell 2002). The kind of
state-civil society regime instituted will depend on the constellation of forces within the
opposition and subsequent alliances as well as the resources available to the state to
meet popular demands.
3.3 Civil Society: Current Issues
According to Bratton (1994a), the concept of civil society offers an opportunity to
understand, and influence, the process of democratisation. But CCS(2001) charges that
the present popularity of civil society hinges on:
[I]ts very fuzziness - it can be all things to all men. There is conflation of an
empirical category - often referred to as the voluntary or non-profit sector- with a
political project. On one hand it is a label for something that is both non-profit and
non governmental while on the other, as in the Central European and Latin America
experience, it is a political project, a sphere through which to resist, pressure or
influence the state, and more recently the market
(www.lse.ac.uklDepts/ccs/pdf/Glasius briefingl).
Wood (1990) charges that "this versatile idea has become an all purpose catchword for
the left, embracing a wide range of emancipatory aspirations, as well - it must be said -
as a whole set of excuses for political retreat" (60).
To Riddell and Bebbington (1995) civil society is a "notoriously slippery concept." They
continue:
It has entered donor terminology without careful definition. In many respects, the
term is used as a code for a set of ideas related to participation, good government,
human rights, privatisation and public sector reform" (23).
Bratton (1994a) echoes this arguing that there are essentially three common elements
in the civil society discourse namely a critique of state domination of public life, a
preference of reform over revolution and a strategy for political change based on
negotiations and elections. CCS (2001) argues that the ideal civil society has various
characteristics, all of which are hotly debated. One contention is that of social capital.
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Putman (1993) stresses that 'civic community' is founded on norms and networks. Such
norms and networks comprise a stock of 'social capital' which social actors draw upon
when they go about their everyday business. In very elementary terms social capital
refers to the trust generated when people come together and the resultant reduction in
the cost of an assortment of activities. Bratton (1994a) sees trust and reciprocity as
important values for the construction of civil society as crucial for the reduction of
transaction costs. Political tolerance is another important virtue in that it allows the
emergence of diverse and plural forms of association. Gellner (1991) argues that the
civic spirit provides the spirit that fulfils contracts and obligations without which there
would be endless enforcement. These values and norms are taught not only in the
family but also in civic society organisations such as schools, churches and other
community groups. (Bratton 1994a). The upside is that this contributes to economic
growth (Gellner 1991). Another contention is that civic life needs to be institutionalised,
meaning that it must find expression in organisations. According to Bratton (1994a) the
most common organisational structure in civil society is the voluntary association, which
is a grouping of citizens who come together by reason of identity or interest to pursue a
common objective. Walzer (cited in Bratton 1994a) contends that civil society breeds
"communal men and women...the picture here is of people freely associating and
communicating.. .forming and reforming groups of all sorts... for the sake of sociability
itself" (3). Cohen and Arato (1992) view ordinary people as the agents of the modern
civil society, creating it through "forms of self constitution and self mobilisation" (17).
Civil society comes into being when citizens create "a sphere other than and even
opposed to the state... includ(ing), almost always unsystematically, some combination of
networks of legal protection, voluntary association, and forms of independent
expression" (Cohen and Arato cited in Bratton 1994a: 3).
Blair (1993b) notes that while policy advocacy groups may have the largest and most
direct impact on national political life, they do not exhaust the relevant organisations in
civil society. "Whether or not they are explicitly oriented to civic or political functions, all
types of voluntary association help to populate and pluralize civil society" (Bratton
1994a: 2). A third element that Bratton (1994a) sees is public communication. He
argues that in order for citizens to be politically active they "require means to
communicate with one another and to debate the type of government they desire for
themselves" (2). While civic discourse can take place in various for a, the existence of a
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diverse and plural public communication media, unconstrained by state or private
monopoly is crucial.
According to the World Bank civil society organisations (CSOs) can perform a range of
essential functions for development. CSOs can:
• provide a means for amplifying the varied and complex needs of society,
particularly the disadvantaged;
• motivate individuals to participate as citizens in the affairs of their societies
• provide services which can target the poor, and are efficient and flexible;
• promote accountability of both governments and the market;
• serve as vehicle (s) for reaching a consensus about trade-off strategies of
developing content and sequencing of social policies
(www.inweb18.worldbank.org)
According to the United Nations Development Program (1993) civil society along with
the state and the market lies at the foundation of democratic societies. The UNDP
continues:
Civil society is the sphere in which social movements become organized. Theorganizations of civil society, which represent many diverse and sometimescontradictory social interests, are shaped to fit their social base, constituency,thematic orientations (e.g. environment, gender, human rights) and types of activity.They include church related groups, trade unions, cooperatives, serviceorganizations, community groups and youth organizations, as well as academicinstitutions and others (UNDP, 1993:1).
According to CCS at the London School ofEconomics (2001), the problem with a purely
normative definition of civil society is that defending civil society as a 'good thing'
becomes tautological: civil society is a good thing, because it espouses the values we
hold. "Anyone who fails to hold these values is not part of civil society. And whose
values, anyway? The desirability of absolute non-violence, for instance, not something
about which everyone agrees" (www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/ccs/odf/Glasius briefing1). For
instance Robinson (1995) notes that the liberal approach "tends to obscure conflicts
between different categories of civic associations and fails to give adequate recognition
to the existence of divisive social forces which are averse to democracy, but
nevertheless form part of 'civil' society" (78).
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In the classical sense, taking your place in civil society meant renunciation of violence
and interaction with other human beings in more complex ways. "A problem with the
modern use of 'civil society' is that we might want to preserve the connotation of non-
violent interaction, while we disavow the Euro-centric assumption of savages versus
civilised people, but the two are historically connected".
(www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/ccs/pdf/Glasius briefingl). "Also based partly on the classical,
18th century notion, civil society is seen as essentially non-violent, and resisting violence,
for instance, through Gandhian forms of civil disobedience"
(www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/ccs/pdf/Glasius briefingl). Another addition of the modern
understanding is the commitment to common human values that go beyond ethnic,
religious or national boundaries.
The CCS at the London School of Economics (2001) argues that a middle ground
between these two conceptions could be to conceive of civil society as an empirical
category with normative traits. This conception would contend that civil society contains
elements of public spiritedness, social trust, non-violence and tolerance. "Unlike the
purely normative conception, however, it would not exclude self-interested, narrow-
minded, violent and fanatical manifestations of social interactions from civil society. It
would recognise that these groups also exist, move in the same sphere, as the 'nice'
groups" (www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/ccs/pdf/Glasiusbriefingl).Itis the contention of this
dissertation that civil society is neither homogeneous nor consensual, but rather it
should be viewed as an arena where actors pursue their different interests both in
competition as well as in collaboration.
Van Rooy (1997) asserts that civil society organisations (CSOs) are seen in aid agency
language as "fomenters of subversive ideas (when communism was seen to be worth
subverting), the 'genuine' voices of the economically (and otherwise) oppressed, and
the underdogs scratching away at the underpinnings of autocracies in China, the Soviet
Union, Eastern Europe, Africa and Latin America" (3). With changes in the world
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the appeal of civil society, according to van
Raoy (1997) "lies in the possibility of a different, moral socio-political vision which
matches the emancipatory vision of socialism, yet which embraces western democratic
notions.
The terms of civil society, its attractive combination of democratic pluralism with
regulation and guidance, make it appear hopeful to societies seeking to recover
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from socialism...Socialism has lost whatever appeal it once possessed (Kumar
1993: 375)
Van Rooy (1997) charges that aid watchers and practitioners have muddled through the
tasks of definition, usually without a satisfactory answer (3). In looking at the issue of
assistance carothers (1997) argues that civil society assistance is potentially all
embracing given the multi-faced nature of civil society organisations, which range from
burial societies to service provider NGOs. Wood (1990) cautions against the wholesale
embrace of "this conceptual portmanteau, which indiscriminately lumps together
everything from households and voluntary associations to the economic system of
capitalism, confuses and disguises as much as it reveals" (65).
Roper-Renshawof Oxfam U5(cited in Van Rooy 1997) cautions against the appeal of an
unexamined rush toward 'civil society' "because development is so complex, an
organising concept like civil society is very appealing.... However, oversimplifications
lead to distortions, poor analyses and poor outcomes," (6). Fowler (1990) argues that
civil society has been equated with organisations: advocacy groups, NGOs,
organisations within social movements and human rights organisations. carothers
(1997) notes:
The single most favoured area of US civil society assistance is that of advocacyNGOs, such as human rights groups, election monitoring organisations... the crucialfeature that distinguishes such organisations... it that they seek to influencegovernmental policy on some specific set of issues. It is this policy-oriented advocacyfunction that US aid officials' hold to be the crux of the pro-democratic function ofcivil society (1997: 114).
While Fowler (1997) regards defining civil society from an operational perspective as
problematic Hearn (1999) contends that in spite of the absence of theoretical clarity and
conflicting understandings of the notion, "in general when foreign donors refer to civil
society they are alluding to a very narrow, specific section of it." This section, echoing
carothers (1997), Hearn (1999) argues, essentially comprises organisations that seek to
influence governmental policy on certain public policy issues. And this has implications.
Whaites (cited in van Rooy: 1997) the ways in which "development NGOs perceive civil
society, and consequently plan projects to facilitate and enhance the work of civil
associations, can have a significant long-term effect on the evolution (or lack of it) of
civil society in the countries in which they work" (6). Van Rooy (1997) charges that this
is especially the case in countries where there is little tradition of civil society, where the
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imported notions of donors often go unchallenged. "Indeed, those interventions may be
countetproductive to the project of social transformation" (van Rooy 1997: 7).
3.4 Some assessment of the perspectives
According to van Rooy (1997), "it is becoming apparent that donors are wielding the
vagueness of 'civil society' as the solution to a very particular set of problems" (7). This
was in the areas of social and economic development, democracy and what van Rooy
(1997) calls "the other agenda". Noting the advance of the non governmental
organisation sector in the 1980s in particular sectors (ability to reach the poorest), van
Rooy (1997) argues that this 'non governmental way' has become part of the way
foreigners have reacted to a mixed success in promoting social and economic
development in other countries. Within this perspective "the worthiness of NGOs as a
resource for - or accompaniment to - foreign and domestic government interventions
has been broadened" (8). Van Rooy (1997) notes a shift to CSOs whose numbers
include but are not limited to the familiar corpus of NGOs. "The distinction is important
because the policy - and power - implications are different" (8).
CSOs broadly are supposed to aid development in four main ways. According to van
Rooy (1997), CSOs can help generate economic growth, improve equity; function as
replacements for waning state services; and they can glue communities together with
social capital.
Van Rooy (1997) asserts that support for "civil society" is felt by some to be a direct
measure of support to the privatisation of the economy, and much of US talk, about civil
society in the former Soviet Union in particular, approaches the debate from this angle.
For instance Hansen (1996) of USAID contends "that the transition from statist to
market based economies can be more effectively consolidated with growth of advocacy
groups that champion such reforms" (2). In China the link between civil society and the
free market has been noted (Howell, 1994; White 1993). Van Rooy (1997) says that the
debate has focussed on the degree to which support to entrepreneurial organisations, in
combination with privatising reforms to government structures, will open up the
economy to external intervention. White (1993) argues "there is a close relationship
between the spread of market relations and the differentiation of ownership brought by
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the Chinese economic reforms on the one hand, and the rise of new forms of social
organisation and the adaptation of existing social organisations on the other" (1993:
67).
3.5 State-Civil Society Relations in South Africa
Gramsci (1971) asserts that one of the functions of the modern state is to adapt civil
society to the economic structure. "Thus, whereas private institutions can be formed
independently of the power of the state, their potential for real opposition, whether it is
progressive or regressive, must be continually checked by the state" (Morera:
1990: 163). Keane (1988a) while acknowledging the democratising role of civil society
echoes this adding that "civil associations always depend for survival and co-ordination
upon centralized state" (Keane, 1988a: 50). Swilling and Russell (2002) in their book
titled The Size and Scope of the Non-profit Sector in South Africa argue that the nature
of the South African state and its political considerations entailed relating differentially
to the 'various civil societies' for much of the twentieth century. Attempts were made
through various colonial 'divide and rule' strategies to break up the potentially
threatening colonised mass into a range of sub-groups, culminating in 'grand apartheid'
from the mid-1900s. As Gramsci (1971) writes about the post-1870s Italian state, the
colonial state and its apartheid offspring could easily 'overcome the conflicts that from
time to time, would emerge sporadically, in a localised fashion, without national nexus
or simultaneity' (Gramsci cited in Morera 1990: 163). Swilling and Russell (2002) charge
that in 1910, the British colonial power and English speaking settlers entered into a
corporatist pact with rising, armed Afrikaner social movements anchored in agriculture.
It is important to stress that this pact was racially structured and restructured through
to the 1970s. "Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, successive waves of
industrialisation and urbanisation resulted in the formation of an Afrikaner working class
and middle class, extremely well organised into NPOs across a range of sectors"
(Swilling and Russell 2002: 68). The state civil society relationship was corporatist and
involved administering health and welfare benefits to white society. SWilling and Russell
(2002) contend that brute state coercion initially sustained this state of affairs but
collapsed from the onslaught of democratic forces. For Morera (1990) this is to be
expected because "once civil society has developed, that is, once there is some national
unity and hence simultaneous action at the national level is possible, then the state
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must change its relation to private institutions, for it can no longer dominate them and
overcome conflicts in an easy way" (163).
Turning to the relationship between the white state and black civil society, Swilling and
Russell (2002) argue that in general the colonial and the apartheid state tolerated the
extensive growth of a diverse and complex black non-profit sector "as long as it
remained apolitical" (69). A philanthropic middle class neither sustained this black non-
profit sector nor did it consist of formalised, apolitical welfarist NPOs similar to Salamon
and Anheier's typologies. And the apartheid state made some ideological mileage,
sustaining throughout the century a racist discourse that justified the denial of black
social development by reference to the ability of blacks to 'look after themselves' in their
own areas and in accordance with their native custom. According to Swilling and Russell
(2002) the black non-profit sector was a mix of largely localised and less formalised
survivalist and oppositional NPOs. "In many ways, the relationship between the white
state and black civil society was almost liberal, in Salamon and Anheier's typology: there
was limited state support for social development and a large non-profit sector" (Swilling
and Russell 2002: 69).
SWilling and Russell (2002) assert that the social movements that provided the cutting
edge to the struggle against apartheid emerged from these "multi-layered and deeply
embedded networks of NPOs" (69). According to Swilling and Russell (2002) these same
organisations (ostensibly shone of their social movement dynamics) have entered into a
non-racial corporatist agreement with the democratic state.
It is apparent that the nature of the state plays an overwhelmingly significant role in the
development and space within which civil society can function. Swilling and Russell
(2002) argue that even the vocabulary comes out of context. They contend that
between the mid- and late 1990s a choice was made as what to call civil society
organisations. "The policy makers and key NGO partners settled on 'NPO' (non profit
organisation): a nice, depoliticised term that transcended the NGO-CBO discussion and
delineated the sector from the private sector" (Swilling and Russell 2002: 6). The nature
of legislation governing associational forms plays a fundamental part. The Act 108 of
1996 guarantees freedom of association (www.etu.org.za).This allows CSOs to
constitute themselves as legal structures and regulates the manner in which they
operate. The Non Profit Organisations Act (1997) defines non-profit organisations as
follows:
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A trust, company or other association of persons established for a public purpose
and the income and property of which are not distributable to its members or office
bearers except as reasonable compensation for services rendered (Non profit
Organisations Act (1997), cited in Swilling and Russell 2002).
What is also becoming increasingly evident is the extent to which donors act to
reconfigure the internal state dynamics. As has been demonstrated throughout this
section depending on the configuration of power within countries, the civil society can
often act at the behest of the state. It is the principal argument of this research that
civil society organisations are acting to impact policy in directions that are fundamentally




This chapter sketches out the individual histories of the organisations making up the
study. An attempt will be made to explain the economic and political conditions that
have determined policy directions. Where possible main areas of criticism are
articulated.
4.1 German Political Foundations Stiftungen
According to Lingnau (1997), the system of the German political foundations has been
unique for twenty years. This is due to the fact that these institutions, which were
initially set up to provide civic education to the German public, enjoy a high degree of
independence and autonomy (Lingnau 1996a). He draws contrast between these
foundations and others doing similar work. For instance while the Foundations obtain
almost all their funding from the government through the Ministry for Economic Co-
operation they are highly autonomous institutions (Lingnau 1997). While they must
apply for funding on a project or programme basis, the application is nothing more than
a formality (Mair 1996b). According to Mair (1996b) "a fixed sum is set aside in the
government's budget for the international activities of the "Stiftungert' - about 350
million DM (approximately 175 million Euros) in 1996 (= 4% of the total foreign aid
budget) - and the allocation of this sum is based on a ratio which is roughly determined
by the size of the parliamentary groups of the parties, the "Stiftungen" are affiliated
with" (1).
Pinto-Du5chnisky and Mair (1991) point out that it was not until the mid-eighties that
the United States, Great Britain and some other countries attempted similar initiatives.
(For instance the creation of the West Minister Foundation in the United Kingdom and
the National Democratic Institute (NDI), affiliated to the Democratic Party and the
International Republican Institute allied to the Republican Party). The Ministry for
Economic Co-operation, which has since the late 1960s funded the activities of German
Foundations or Stiftungen officially defines the their mandate as:
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providing support to partners who have a structurally important contribution to maketo the realisation of social justice, the promotion of broad political participation andto the strengthening of national political independence in accordance with the aimslaid down in the UN Declaration of Human Rights" (www.ecdpm.org)
The Foundations generally also work to build and sustain contacts with the "most
important economic, social and political forces abroad" (www.oneworld.org/ecdpm).
According to Mair (1996a) two features distinguish the work of German Foundations
from other organisations involved in political work: long-term partnerships and the
short-term funding of new political initiatives. For instance Mair (1996a) notes that the
activities of the Stittungen in a certain country are not based on an elaborate framework
or rigorous academic analysis of the respective political environment. "Instead, the
"Stiftungen" are committed to the partisan support of specific sections of the social and
political realm whose existence is - in their opinion - a necessary ingredient for the
functioning of a pluralistic democracy" (6). The choice of partners will then depend on
political values and convictions of the particular Foundation.
Mair (1997) sees value in this approach while noting ostensible advantages in the
approach of other democracy actors. For instance while other organisation involved in
democratisation work profess non-partisan and less interventionist strategies, Stittungen
follow a "clearly partisan approach" (Mair 1997: 7). While this approach has merit, it
"also disregards the importance of political parties in establishing democracies and their
role as a link between civil society and the state. Many newly established democratic
regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa suffer from the weakness of opposition parties which are
not able to achieve their main functions: to control the government and to develop
alternative policies" (Mair 1997: 8). Mair (1997) argues that while the non-partisan
approach tends to frame political transition in mechanical terms, the approach of
Stittungen acknowledges the importance of individual actors, organisations and timely
intervention in democratisation processes. "The decisive actors often need a long-term
perspective of assistance based on close personal relationships to their sponsors, and
objectives which were completely adequate in a certain period of the transition process
can lose any importance within a few months" (Mair 1997: 7).
Political parties are an indispensable ingredient of liberal, multi-party democracies -
systems that were almost unanimously adopted by most African states. If they are weak
they should be supported to overcome their structural deficits and not be sidelined and
reduced to a pariah status. Their potential to develop programmes and policies as well
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as their organisational capacities should be strengthened. Internal democratic
procedures, transparency and accountability should be promoted (Mair 1997: 8)
The activities of the German Foundations are broadly structured in such a way that they
aim to attain or reflect the political consensus in Germany:
• the principle of peaceful conflict resolution
• a democratic form of state order
• the rule of law, horizontal and vertical division of powers
• the protection of human rights and fundamental political rights
• a pluralistic society, a social market economy and integration into transnational
bodies. (Mair 1996a: 2).
Lingnau (1997) argues that within this general values framework, Stiftungen then
fashion activities in such a way that they focus on the political beliefs or areas of stress
of the political parties they are affiliated to. Broadly the Stiftungen have focused on
strengthening of free trade unions and political parties by supporting their educational
and training facilities, civic education, support for parliaments, rule-of-Iaw-programmes,
mass media and research institutes in social sciences as well as decentralisation.
According to Mair (1997), the German system of political Stiftungen has many
advantages when compared with other ways of funding political work. The principal
advantage he continues lies in a pluralistic and value-based approach.
The clearly recognisable values and stance of each foundation has been the basis of
a trustful, long-term and reliable co-operation between them and their partners.
Pronounced value orientation would be a problem if there were only one donor
organisation available to civil society groups or parties and if those values were not
made explicit... Value-orientation without pluralism on the part of the donors implies
the danger of imposing certain values on a society in transition. But in the case of
the German political "Stiftungen" almost each civil society organisation or party in
African countries has the chance to select a suitable partner. The present range of
potential partners will even broaden if the German post-communist party succeeds in
establishing a foundation of its own (Mair 1997: 9).
Mair (1997) further argues that plurality and clear value orientation is considerably more
feasible when democratisation assistance is run by non-governmental organisations.
According to Mair (1997) this is because NGOs can be partisan. This can be contrasted
with government agencies that can barely define political values beyond a general
commitment to socio-economic development and democracy. "They also cannot risk
explicitly taking the side of the partner when they run into a confrontation with the
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government because of the repercussions such an intervention has on the diplomatic
relationship of the donor country to the recipient country" (Mair 1997: 10).
4.2 Stiftungen in Africa: The Past
According to Mair (1996b), claims by the foundations that they have been involved in
democratisation work for the last thirty years are without foundation. The claim appears
more plausible for the last 10 years. "Up to the late eighties the HSS (Hanns-Seidel-
Stiftung), FES (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung) and KAS (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung) cooperated
with many authoritarian regimes and single parties. Such cooperation raised a lot of
suspicion in the German public" (Mair 1996: 3). Mair (1996b) contends that the role of
German Foundations in Sub-Saharan Africa is tainted by engagement with post
independence dictatorships. He points out that the long-lasting engagement of German
Foundations in Zaire; Kenya, Uganda, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire "casts a cloud on their
activities" (4). It also indicates that for many years the pursuit of the promotion of
development and the pursuance of partisan foreign policies was paramount rather than
the promotion of democracy.
Mair (1996a) argues that the engagement with authoritarian regimes was underpinned
by the "central assumption of the modernisation theory which claims that - for a
transitional period - development needs a strong and authoritarian regime." In this
period the Foundations were more development-oriented than democracy-oriented.
"Their more politically motivated work was very much directed towards the state, its
institutions, the ruling party and mass movements affiliated to them" (Mair 1996a: 5).
Mair (1996a) contends that all German Foundations ran programmes aimed at
strengthening the capacities of respective public administrations. For, instance the FES
supported many trade unions and women's associations that were merely appendages
of ruling parties. "Ruling parties in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Zaire,
Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, Togo and many more were assisted by the German Stittungen in
improving their organisational structures, professionalising their staff and elaborating
their programmes" (Mair 1996a: 6).
The question that immediately arises is why these Foundations helped prop up these
unsavoury regimes. According to Mair (1996a) the Foundations justify their work from a
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number of angles. Firstly any attempt to help critics of the regimes would have been
unviable, they would have been expelled. Secondly, more controversially, "the demand
for democratisation assistance was very low" (Mair 1996a: 5). They claim controversially
opposition groups sought not to replace the incumbent regimes with "more democratic
and liberal systems but by themselves" (Mair 1996a: 5). Mair (1996a) claims that these
considerations forced the Foundations to embark on a long-term and indirect approach
to democracy promotion. They sought to achieve the following:
• the establishment of democratic structures in their partner organisations
• to expose their leaders and members to democratic ideas and values
• to support the careers of those who seemed to be committed to democracy
• to train journalists to professionally play their part in the political game (Mair
1996a: 5)
Traditionally the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) was committed to the worldwide pursuit
of social justice, while on the other hand, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) and the
HSS saw their role predominantly in aiding the growth of market economies. However
following the end of the Cold War, ideological differences between the Foundations have
evaporated. Stemming directly from this situation, a consensus has arisen among the
Foundations: that their primary role should be to contribute to the extension and
promotion of democracy worldwide and that they should complement each other's
efforts (Mair 1996). It is for this reason that the research chose one German foundation
for the study.
Mair (1997) argues that while the political environment or the nature of the transition
does not determine the selection of partners it influences the means used to support
them. This means that in a very repressive environment the Stiftungen resort to an
apparently apolitical assistance to certain sections of the society trying to guarantee
their survival until a window of opportunity opens up in which they can openly promote
political and opposition role of their partners. In decisive stages of a transition period
the financial and administrative fleXibility of the Stiftungen enables them to mobilise
funds at very short notice to support the activities of central actors (Mair 1997: 6)
According to Mair (1997) the foundation for both the long-term partnerships and the
short-term initiatives is the presence of a field representative in the country or the
region. "He/she provides the thorough analysis of the political process, which is
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necessary to identify the right partners as well as the right instruments and to react in a
flexible way to changes and opportunities" (Mair 1997: 7). Mair (1997) further asserts
that the presence of country representative personalises the commitment of the
Foundations to a trustful and long-term relationship.
4.3 Stiftungen in South Africa
According to Mair (1996a), the KAS provided financial and material support to the
Inkatha Party by funding its think tank the former Inkatha Institute, now Institute for
Federal Democracy. Away from politics it also implemented two socially oriented
programmes, a cooperatives development project and a community service-training
project in KwaZulu Natal. In the early nineties, Mair (1996a) asserts that the KAS
broadened their activities in South Africa ostensibly as a result of the "realisation that
Inkatha had not delivered what the KAS expected" (5). Through a project called Political
Dialogue in South Africa, they worked with a range of 'changing partners': women
groups, business associations, economic and political research institutes and political
parties such as the Democratic Party and National Party. In 1997, they started a
decentralisation project in Northern Province, an area overwhelmingly supportive of the
ANC.
Mair (1996a) sees the activities of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation as less
controversial vis-a-vis the other Stiftungen. For instance they funded the Institute for a
Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA). IDASA aimed to serve as a forum and
mediating body for discussions and negotiations between blacks and whites within
South Africa. Mair (1996a) asserts that by providing assistance to the diverse spectrum
of groups in South Africa Stiftungen contributed significantly to peaceful change and
democratisation. The cornerstones of this contribution were:
• long-term and close partnerships with political and social organisations opposing
apartheid;
• enabling critics of the apartheid system to stay and earn their living in South
Africa;
• promoting moderate forces in the opposition movement who are committed to
peaceful means;
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• providing fora for political opponents in which they can meet, discuss and build
up mutual trust;
• and reacting in a very flexible way to promising, new political initiatives by
providing material and financial support (Mair 1996a).
According to Mair (1996a), the success of this strategy in South Africa has had an
impact on the approach now employed by the Foundations in their democracy
promotion work in other Sub-Saharan African countries since the late 80s.
4.4 Konrad AdenauerStiftung and Civil Society in South Africa
The Konrad Adenauer Foundation contends that since the end of apartheid "South Africa
has become the most outstanding example of a sustainable shift towards democracy
and political pluralism on the African continent" (www.kas.org.za). The motivation for
the organisation's work in the country is to support the process of political social and
economic transformation towards a modern democracy.
The existence of a set of functioning political parties is indispensable for a democratic
society. This includes that these parties are democratically structured internally as well
as that a number of parties with different views and visions engage in a fair political
contest bringing about political compromise; which in itself reflects the variety and
weight of opinions in the country. Furthermore, all constitutional powers - judicial,
legislative, executive - must be enabled to operate effectively and efficiently, on the
basis of overall societal consensus as well as the law.
The foundation sees civil society as central to its endeavours. This work entails activities
to mobilise civil society organisations, such as human right groups, environmental
protection organisations and other lobby and self-help groups, "since every democracy




The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is an arm of the
United States government that implements foreign, economic and humanitarian
assistance programmes. The history of USAID dates back to the Marshall Plan, which
sought to reconstruct Europe after the Second World War and the Truman
Administration's Point Four Programme. However the formalisation of the agency only
came into effect in 1961 following the signing in law of the Foreign Assistance Act into
law by President Kennedy (www.usaid.govl).
Since that time, the agency has been the principal vehicle for the US to assist countries
"recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty and engaging in democratic reforms"
(www.smb-support.org). The agency receives guidance from the Secretary of State.
Broadly however US foreign assistance has always "had the twofold purpose of
furthering America's foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and free markets
while improving the lives of the citizens of developing world" (www.usaid.gov).
Areas of interest include the following:
• economic growth and agricultural development
• population, health and nutrition
• environment
• democracy and governance
• education and training, and
• humanitarian assistance
The agency works in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Near East, Latin America and the
caribbean, and Europe and Eurasia. USAID works in partnership with non-governmental
organisations, indigenous organisations, universities, American businesses and
international agencies.
According to Blair (2001), starting in the 1990s democracy became one of USAIDs
principal objectives. At the same time, he points out, civil society surfaced as a central
component of the democracy sector and crucially the focus of an increasing number of
program activities. "At the end of the 20th century civil society had become the largest
single component in the Agency's Democracy and Governance Sector, with programs
active in 63 countries" (Blair 2001: 1).
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4.6 IDASA - Chapter 2 Network
Set up in 1987, IDASA is a nationally recognised public interest organisation in South
Africa. It has offices in cape Town and Pretoria and has international links with many
similar organisations. Its programmes primarily involve the monitoring of government
behaviour. It employs permanent and contract staff. "These contracts are related to
particular programmes and projects of the institute - some are short term, other have a
three year cycle" (www.idasa.org.za).
IDASA works with all the main political parties and "ideological tendencies inside the
country to achieve democratic outcomes". According to its home page, IDASA
"maintains its independence and capacity through a range of diverse funding
mechanisms" (www.idasa.org.za). It has a partnership relationship with many
international donors - both government and private sector. It has a fee-for-service
component and a domestic fund-raising programme. Since the 1994 elections and the
establishment of democratic government it has provided services to national, provincial
and local government. These include tripartite agreements - between a donor, the
government and IDASA - and fee for service arrangements (www.idasa.org.za).
IDASA bids for projects on its own or in partnership with other non-governmental
organisations and commercial companies. An advantage acknowledged on its website is
that "it meets the accounting and project requirements of the canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA), Swedish Development Agency (SIDA), Danish
Development Agency (DANIDA), Swiss Development Corporation (SDC), Friedrich
Naumann Stiftung, Ford Foundation, European Union and USAI[J' (www.idasa.org.za).
An important criterion is that the projects should aim to enhance its mission of
consolidating democracy.
4.7 Democracy Development Programme (DDP)
This initiative was started in 1993. The DDP has operated predominantly in KwaZulu
Natal but has recently opened an office in the Northern Province. The organisation aims
to promote "those values and institutions in keeping with an open and democratic
society" (www.racism.gov.za!pr!workshop). DDP believes that all aspects of civil society
should be mobilised and empowered to consolidate and enrich democracy. The
47
organisation sponsors a vigorous and enlightened civil society that is not dominated by
the state and embraces respect for minorities and plural views.
Its principal aims are as follows:
• To provide capacity building workshops for the smaller parties, local government
structures and communities in order to strengthen political participation and
promote divergent views;
• To provide capacity building programmes for the previously disadvantage groups
(women, the rural poor and the marginalized youth) so that they are able to
interact meaningfully with local government structures in order to increase
political participation as well as to ensure effective service delivery;
• To provide forums where controversial and vigorous political debate is
encouraged;
• To work together with other like-minded NGO's and institutions in order to
create more sustainable programmes that contribute to the effective fulfilling of
our vision;
• Providing political education and elaborating through ongoing action research,
the provision of advice to the scientific foundations for political action.
(www.racism.gov.za/pr/workshop).
As a consequence, DDPworks with a cross section of civil society. Among them are the
following:
• Political parties
• Community and Civic Organisations
• Youth Organisations
• Students at Tertiary Institutions
• Women's Groups
• Local Government Councillors
• Traditional Leaders
• Ward Committees
The organisation hosts political forums where leaders from different political groupings
speak, while a cross section of civil society is in attendance. The audience is encouraged
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to interact both with the speaker and fellow participants in order to promote an
enlightened and vibrant civil society.
DDP has in keeping with recent practice a women's empowerment programme. "This
programme was launched in order to further capacitate women for greater involvement
in the political arenas well as to discuss critical issues affecting the rights of women
under our present Constitution" (www.racism.gov.za/pr/workshop). According to Naidu,
programme director at DDp, the Forum serves both an advocacy and lobbying function,
while providing capacity building programmes.
DDP is a member of a number of organisations. It is a member of the Pan-African Civic
Educators Network (PACE-NET). Formed in 996, by 30 NGO's representing 12 African
countries working in the field of civic education, PACE-NET aims to provide an effective
African civic education network. This will be done through the sharing of resources and
expertise in order to "in-root a democratic culture for sustainable democratic practice in
Africa" (www.racism.gov.za/pr/workshop). Another organisation that DDP is a member
of is the South African Non-Governmental Organisation Coalition (SANGOCO). Launched
in 1995 with a focus on funding and organisational issues facing NGO's in South Africa,
SANGOCO is made up of a wide cross-section of NGO's. The coalition is a powerful
lobbying body (www.racism.gov.za/pr/workshop). At the global stage DDP is in the
African chapter of the CIVICUS, which is a global body that aims to elevate the role of
civil society in decision-making and development.
4.8 Electoral Institute ofSouthern Africa (EISA)
The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa focuses on elections, electoral practices and
seeks to promote democratic governance throughout the Southern African region. The
organisation aims to achieve these objectives by "promoting free and fair elections and
a popular appreciation of democratic practices and principles" (www.eisa.org.za). The
organisation is a number of arms. The Democracy Development Unit "identifies and
conducts research projects designed to promote democracy and good governance"
while the Democracy and Electoral Education Unit offers education and training
programmes with the intention of promoting the goals of free and fair elections and
democratic governance (www.eisa.org.za). The Programme Development and
Consultancy serves as a project manager and secretariat for major projects in the
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regions such as the Elections Commission Forum of SADC countries and the NGO
Network of Electoral Support in Southern Africa.
Principal donors include the European Union and USAID
4.9 Centre for Public Participation (CPP)
The CPP began as the Provincial Parliamentary Programme (PPP) in 1998. Organisations
instrumental in the setting up included the IDASA, Black Sash, Institute for Multi Party
Development (IMPD) and Lawyers for Human Rights. In 2002 it registered as an
independent organisation called the Centre for Public Participation. The CPP aims to
accomplish the following:
To increase civil society participation in government processes
To empower civil society to hold government responsible for the
delivery of accountable and accessible governance
To provide information, networking, training and advocacy
support to strengthen community advocacy initiatives
To advocate for effective government mechanisms to facilitate
public participation.
The organisation is structured into two units namely the Communications Unit and the
Training and Advocacy Unit. The Communication Unit has a number of objectives such
as monitoring and explaining developments and implementation of national and
provincial legislation. The aim is to assess the space for public participation in the
processes. "CPP staff work with government stakeholders to implement and strengthen
public participation structures and mechanisms to facilitate this process"
(www.cpp.org.za). To bring substance to this the organisation produces newsletters in
English and Zulu to update civil society on policy and legislative structures and the
opportunities open for citizen participation. Through its Training and Advocacy Unit, CPP
runs initiatives to build capacity at the district level for civil society organisations to
monitor local government processes such as the implementation of the Integrated
Development Plans. 'The CPP produces a range of training material and publications
enabling civil society groups to understand and access local government structures and
processes" (www.cpp.org.za). In addition to these efforts the centre is a member of a
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local consortium, which provides training at municipal level for representatives from
councillors, officials, traditional leadership and community stakeholders. This is intended
to build relationships, deepen partnerships and facilitate heightened public participation.
The CPP also runs workshops for rural based community based organisations (CBOs) in
the 11 local government districts of KwaZulu-Natal. These are aimed at making bare the
processes of government and proffering strategies for engagement.
Donors include USAID, Mott Foundation, Ford, Open Society, Danish Embassy and
DFID. The director was interviewed for this study.
4.10 South African Non-Governmental Organisation Coalition (SANGOCO)
According to the SANGOCO website (www.sangoco.org.za) the coalition came about as
a result of the need to "coordinate NGO input into the Government policy and ensure
that the rich traditions of civil society - forged in the resistance to apartheid - continue
to serve the people of South Africa". SANGOCO is the largest single NGO umbrella body
in Southern Africa.
The constitution of a democratically elected government in 1994 with the stated aim of
ending poverty through various policy initiatives among them "democratising the state
and strengthening civil society" (www.sangoco.org.za). spurred SANGOCO to support
these endeavours. But following "a number of significant policy shifts"
(www.sangoco.org.za) on the part of government the coalition has reassessed its role.
The shifts centre on a new economic framework which "was meant to redistribute
wealth, create jobs and generate economic growth but the opposite is true because of
its neo-Iiberal character" (www.sangoco.org.za).
SANGOCO is made of a National Assembly, which is the highest decision-making body.
The National Assembly constituted by Provincial and Sartorial delegates reviews the
coalition's progress, adopts resolutions and elects a National Executive Committee every
two years.
Provincial Assemblies, Councils and Executive Committees are "constituted in all nine
provinces of South Africa to coordinate the Coalition's work at the regional level and
local level" (www.sangoco.org.za).
51
SANGOCO is funded entirely by Atlantic Philanthropies. The acting regional coordinator
in KwaZulu-Natal was interviewed for this research.
4.11 Centre for Civil Society (CCS), University ofNatal (UNO)
The Centre, established in 2001, seeks to promote study of the non-profit sector "as a
legitimate and flourishing area of scholarly activity" and to nurture collaboration in
knowledge sharing and capacity building in civil society (www.nu.ac.za/ccs). Strategies
to achieve these objectives include providing research grants to outside scholars,
institutes and CSOs, running its own research unit with internal research programmes,
post graduate and skills training for CSO workers and an information agency that acts
as "a nexus for civil society and for the study of civil society" (www.nu.ac.za/ccs).
Funders include Atlantic Philanthropies, the Mott Foundation, Ford Foundation, the





This chapter explores the conditions under which civil society organisations operate. It
attempts to measure the extent to which civil society is carrying out its perceived roles
given the circumstances. This will be done through an examination of both the manner
in which USAID and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation assist civil society and the broad
response of selected civil society organisations to these endeavours. At the same time
the role that civil society is supposed to play in a plural democracy provides a
soundtrack. Tied to the above the research will reveal how the civil society
organisations, namely Chapter 2 Network, Centre for Public Participation (CPP), Centre
for Civil Society (CCS), Democracy Development Program (DDP) Electoral Institute of
Southern Africa (EISA) and SANGOCO, interviewed for this study understand their role
and the means through which they have acted to promote it.
5:1 Analysis of Findings
Examining the impact that donors are having on the civil society terrain in South Africa
is essential. It is important in the beginning to interrogate the claims that civil society is
critical for democracy. At the same time, it is important to unpack the power
asymmetries in the sector and arrive at a realistic understanding of what is happening in
the sector, and to then assess whether this is, indeed, important for democracy. This is
particularly urgent given many competing interests making claims on the post-Apartheid
state. This research contributes, in an impressionistic way, to this understanding and
sheds some light on the relationship between selected donors and some civil society
organisations.
Interviews conducted with key personnel at both the USAID and the Konrad Adenauer
Stiftung reveal that there are no specific endeavours aimed at capacity building at the
macro level of civil society. While for instance USAID rhetoric attaches importance to
capacity building in civil society as a sector the manner in which their civil society
programme is structured has the effect of selectively intervening to strengthen
particular civil society organisations and particular civil society activities. Nomea
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Masihleho1 points out the recent adversarial relationship of the state and civil society
during the apartheid years. "This programme supports South African efforts to address
the need for a full and sustainable transition of civil society from struggle against an
illegitimate government to increasing collaboration with a legitimate democratic
government to achieve a shared developmental vision" (USAID 2000). Masihleho asserts
that the Agency does not fund "community based organisations or social movements
[ ... ] these groups could access support through the workshops and projects run by our
partner organisations" (Masihleho in interview, 2002).
It goes without saying that USAID strategies aimed at building capacity across the
sector are anchored by this conceptual approach, specifically in terms of how they
frame the role of civil society. This approach excludes those elements of civil society
such as social movements and community based organisations (C80s) that also seek to
influence policy. According to Janine Hicks2 and S'bo Zamisa3 this approach effectively
leaves out a large group of organisations that are close to the 'ground'. Zamisa
contends this is a serious problem requiring attention because "you will find that these
are the organizations that respond to the immediate needs, specific issues, that are
directly affecting the people" (Zamisa: interview 2003). Adam Habib4 contends it is
unarguable that particular discourses predominate as a consequence of the direction of
funding. Claude Kabemba5 charges that certain organisations "are sitting on huge
amounts of resources" (Kabemba: interview 2003). Zamisa agrees that these are
traditional white organizations "such as IDASA that are known, that are well established
... having interest in terms of issues of development both at national and international
level. There's a lot of resources then" (Zamisa: interview 2003).
Masihleho stresses the importance of eqUipping civil society to assume "its rightful role
in a democracy" and that role "should shift from a conflictual one to a collaborative
engagement with the state" (Masihleho: interview, 2002). According to USAlfJ s Civil
Society Strengthening Program (2000) the "theme of the challenge faced by civil society
as being the transition from civil society in a 'struggle' mode to civil society in a
I Nomea Masihleho is head of USAID's Civil Society Strengthening Program in South Africa, interview
16-10-2002
2 Janine Hicks is director at the Centre for Public Participation, in Durban, interview April 2003
3 S'bo Zamisa is acting provincial coordinator for SANGOCO in KwaZulu-Natal, interview April 2003
4 Prof. Adam Habib is the director of the Centre for Civil Society, University of Natal, Durban, interview
April 2003
5 Claude Kabemba is senior researcher at the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) in
Johannesburg, interview March 2003
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'partnership' mode was consistently highlighted by CSO representatives through the
consultative processes held for the design of this program" (1). Masihleho (electronic
mail: 2002) sees "engaging with government in addressing development priorities" and
addressing "the leadership brain drain the sector has suffered since 1994" as the
biggest challenges facing civil society in South Africa.
According to Shubane (cited in Habib and Kotze 2002), some commentators see
government's annoyance (with criticism) as expressive of a "desire to ensure that civil
society organisations move away from policy debates into direct service delivery in
partnership with itself - a role which, of course, would not pose any direct challenge to
government decisions and would create an interdependence which would reduce civil
society's freedom of action" (12).
Scholars such as Howell (1995) make a distinction between mainstream and alternative
approaches to civil society. She contends that the mainstream approach, which
dominates donor thinking and research, has viewed civil society as part of a problem-
solving agenda for addressing poverty and inequality. In essence this incorporates a
consensual view of relations between civil society, the market and the state within the
context of socially responsible capitalism. According to Howell civil society is viewed
instrumentally as a benign policy alternative to the developmental state, within a neo-
liberal economic agenda.
On the other hand, the alternative approach of some radical European NGOs and
grassroots movements sees a more robust or conflictual role for civil society in
countering the deleterious impacts of the state. They see this role as emphasizing the
critical role of civil society in nurturing new ways of taking part in decision-making; with
the crucial question being how the poor and marginalized can create space to effectively
take part in social and economic life.
Crucially to this research Christina Teichmann6 says the Konrad Adenauer involved in
democratisation work meet "regularly with other German Foundations in order to avoid
overlap and to ensure that we are not doing the same thing or funding the same
organisations. We do this because we have the same goal: to promote democracy"
(Teichmann: interview, 2002). While Teichmann points out that "our intention is not to
6 Christina Teichrnann is Programme Officer at the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Foundation), interview
17-10-2002
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impose German values on South Africa" the existence of coordination with other
German political foundations, with USAID and other donors such as the European Union
(Masihleho: interview 2002) mean that donors may be deciding disproportionately which
civil society organisations are equipped to play a role in society. Teichmann explains
Konrad Adenauer's approach to finding civil society partners:
As an organisation we have broad gUidelines on areas that we are going to fund. We
then call for proposals. These must be structured in a particular way. We have a
strategy behind what we do. It is this strategy we use when we decide on what we
do, that there is a match between what we want to do and what the organisation
wants. We then check if it falls in our framework of activities. We do not choose as
someone would choose in a supermarket. This is a nice parcel, that one is not and
so on. However our intention is not to impose German values on South Africa. We
want to promote positive things (Teichmann: interview, 2002)
According to Mair (1997), the following citation explains the system of German
Foundations:
The clearly recognisable values and stance of each foundation has been the basis of
a trustful, long-term and reliable co-operation between them and their partners.
Pronounced value orientation would be a problem if there were only one donor
organisation available to civil society groups or parties and if those values were not
made explicit... Value-orientation without pluralism on the part of the donors implies
the danger of imposing certain values on a society in transition. But in the case of
the German political Stiftungen almost each civil society organisation or party in
African countries has the chance to select a suitable partner. The present range of
potential partners will even broaden if the German post-communist party succeeds in
establishing a foundation of its own (Mair 1997: 9).
The conceptual approaches can be expected to influence the methodologies used for
interventions. The range of realities becomes apparent. These organisations are setting
out to build capacity within particular civil society organisations with the express aim of
influencing public policy. The critical question that arises is why influence particular
policies and why not another set of policies? The next question that arises is: what is
the purpose of advocating certain policies and who is determining the answer to these
questions. According to Rama Naidu7 at the Democracy Development Programme in
KwaZulu-Natal there have been attempts by donors, specifically the European Union, to
not only determine civil society activities but the geographical location as well. As Naidu
states:
They will try and stipulate where you work. Some are interested in Durban and some
of them, like the EU for example, ...they tried to change our proposals. They said we
7 Dr Rama Naidu is head of the Democracy Development Programme, a partner organisation of the
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, interview 23-8-2002
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must work in Durban Metro because we have infrastructure there and I said no we
shouldn't be working in Durban, they don't need the resources, you know that kind
of debate...(Naidu: interview, 2002)
Samantha FlemingB and Naidu of DDP perceive another contentious issue: a herd
mentality at the behest of donors. Naidu explains that:
[t]here was a time when it was gender, gender... right now the big thing is HIV/AIDS.
They (donors) only help when they find the problem on HIV/AIDS as if there is other
development (do not exist)... you know there is sort of fashion of the day. There is the
grant of 700 million Rands from KwaZulu- Natal for HIV... there's been a lot of money
for AIDS from international governments and people see opportunities and go for it
(Naidu: interview, 2002)
Zamiso echoes Naidu's contention, adding that "now we have been told that the
next big thing is child rights" (Zamisa: interview 2003). Adam Habib contends "its
not about resources only... its about what's sexy, what's not" (Habib: interview
2003). For Fleming the influence is perceptible even in the vocabulary.
I think funders do have more power. When I was doing workshops a while ago you
ask people what they do... sometimes you hear words advocacy, lobbying,
democracy. Actually you know 10 years ago a couple of people used the word
democracy, you know what I mean, but in our days its everywhere ...that's great if
that's true but a lot of the time its just what they think the funders want to hear
(Fleming: interview, 2002).
Both Fleming and Naidu contend that certain issues are being neglected and that may
be a result of the absence of funding to tackle them. Naidu points to the high
unemployment especially among the youth as an example. In their work titled Non-
governmental organisations and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: An impact
assessment, van de Merwe et al (1999) found little manoeuvrability in terms of selecting
which projects they engage "as their funding is generally tied to specific projects"
(www.csvr.org.za/papers).
Another crucial point is the perceived embedded nature of the relationship between
established CSOs and the donor community. Zamisa points out an associated
additional problem; the existence of chains or consortia at the top of which are well
established of CSOs who then act as conduits for funding. Kabemba evaluates the
situation;
I will put it bluntly the relationship between the director of the institution and
donors has become more friendly and more personalised. As a result there is
8 Samantha Fleming is Project Manager for Chapter 2 Network at IDASA, a programme which provides
support for civil society organisations involved in advocacy in South Africa 5-7-2002
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discussion between the donors and the organisation in terms of what needs
to be funded (Kabemba: interview 2003).
Hicks argues that from her experience "you've got to be part of that network. You've
got to be seen as a leader in your sector" (Hicks interview: 2003). Zamisa adds that
these networks typically include organisations that are like-minded:
Now these guys from rural areas do not know what is happening in urban areas.
They don't know if funders are more interested into certain programs, areas. They
don't have any relations with partners with funders. As often funders look for a
well-known organization and CBOs in rural areas do not have the capacity. But in a
way this is dis-empowering because it doesn't open opportunities and chances for
emerging organizations to access funding...our challenge is to ensure there's
funding that is being allocated to people (Zamisa: interview 2003)
Historically, answers to issues of areas of engagement have been found in the
configuration of power between donors and the receivers of aid. According to Clayton
(1996) capacity building programmes are often shaped by the donor's own
requirements for effective project implementation and reporting, and based on the
donor's sectoral priorities. Recently these have included poverty reduction,
democratisation, environmental change or conflict reduction and decentralisation. Some
commentators such as Lipson (www.intrac.org) point out that this results in a tendency
for civil society capacity building interventions to be compartmentalised and short-term,
failing adequately to assess the totality of the environment in which civil society
organisations exist and function. Zamisa explains the politics of funding
Now the politics is between the interest of the funders and of the community
because CBOs or CSOs can develop programs and projects on the basis of
responding to the needs of the community. You11 find that interests of funders lead
them away from their own programs and their own interest. NGOs might ... change
their programs to suit the funders needs. At the end of the day, the communities
are not the beneficiary in the real sense though there11 be some kind of delivery ...
the organizations were not started on the basis. Now that's the whole political
aspect.
In a trenchant critique of the mainstream approach, Howell (1995) asserts that a key
weakness in practice has been the lack of appreciation of the contextual understanding
58
of civil society in different countries. With the result that, according to Naidu, civil
society organisations, have acted in ways that appear determined by those paying the
piper.
NGOs have often crossed that line and they often cross that line. It is either
because of funders and because of donors...they come with their own agendas,
you know, if the donor is closer to the ruling party they want projects to stay with
particular group. They trust that geographical location, they trust their subjects
(issues) and this can be manipulated very easily and the same thing with
opposition party. I think that has happened, as is the case in many countries
(Naidu: interview, 2002).
While acknowledging these issues Hicks is not disillusioned:
I'm not cynical about donors controlling an area...that's stupid. We've been able to
overcome that within our organization. What I am cynical about is certain
organizations who know that there's funding for XYZ, so they quickly go into a
program in XYZ until they can get funding. Then to that extent the donor
institutions are controlling program areas that NGOs are undertaking. But this is
not because of donor organization.. .it's because of NGOs wanting to access donor
funding networks. There's a lot of funding to do projects, we must get each project
going. I think it's very superficial to blame donors for that. Donors can't force
organizations to do the work. You can't force an NGO to do work. They have said
that there can be critical questions about how they come up with their priority
areas
According to Naidu, the manner in which DDP has related with donors has been to
consistently assert their independence as an organisation in the programmes and
projects they implement. Weaker organisations may not be able to achieve this given
the perceived power of donors.
We had a problem with the European Union. They tried to change our programmes
to their ends and we said no, we can't do this. We spent considerable time doing it...
and all the other societies appreciated the honesty. And I think professionalism is the
approach to the world .. .! think that is the way that NGOs have to stand to structure
themselves now this is our capacity; this is where we are working. Here is our
track record, now this is our programme we want to do it as promised, if you want
to come on board as part, come along so we changed the door to NGOs relationship
and is interesting because we actually have a very positive feedback from the
donors. Its normally, we tell you guys what we need. But what we mean this time;
you came to us and told us to join. This is what we want, they like the approach.
They like the approach of NGOs working together, they like the approach of us
taking the ownership of the programme and taking on as partners not in terms of...
in fact in terms of donors staff soon we don't want your money because you have
too many other things attached to this (Naidu: interview, 2002)
Hicks believes that "in the main, I think donors are becoming more responsible. I think
yes, maybe five, ten years ago definitely, five (they) were dictating, (in the past) three
years there was no agenda (in civil society) but now I think everyone is working pretty
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much on professional basis. They (donors) know they can't be arrogant to come up with
whatever other program areas, they've got to talk people in the field" (Hicks: interview
2003). In an effort to attend to these issues donors have developed processes to
address these concerns. Hicks argues that professionalism in civil society has earned
respect and has begun to yield some positive results.
Some of them... have consultation, good processes where they will invite callers
from their sector. They want other issues. Where are the gaps? What should we
focus on? How should we as the donor partner go by claiming our support to the
sector based on the input from the civil society stakeholders? They will come up
with the program area. USAID also did a big consultation process with civil society
groups to hear what should be their primary objective. Which area should they be
concentrating on?
While noting the importance of this development, a number of key questions need
answers. For instance, while, the setting up consultative processes with "C50
representatives" is to be applauded, the extent to which the design reflects the diversity
of civil society is difficult to ascertain chiefly because of issues around the
representativeness of "C50 representatives". What comes out of the interviews with
both sets of organisations (donors and civil society organisations) is C50s are
undertaking an agenda reflecting largely donor concerns. As a consequence CBOs which
like social movements are, in theory seen, as "occupying and expanding a 'public
sphere' within civil society" fail to bring up new issues and values into this sphere
(Foweraker 1995: 31) In addition the absence of appropriate capacity assessment
methods at the civil society level exacerbates this tendency. Anne Garbutt's
(www.intrac.org) work on Central Asia found that much donor practice in the region has
been based on and informed by models of development experience from very different
regions of the world, with a lack of understanding of Central Asian societies.
But what is the role of civil society in South Africa according to civil society
organisations? According to Fleming the challenge is to bring about the realisation of
social and economic rights as enshrined in the constitution.
The role of civil society in democracy is one of probing and antagonising and
pushing...After 1994 people were happy to give it in time and happy to celebrate
the fact that they had political rights... but the reality is that, now couple of years
down the line, people are asking some for change. Then you have the arms deal
where government is spending billions... This does not seem to reflect the
economic needs of its citizens...people are starting to be aware that they actually
have a right (Fleming: interview, 2002).
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Fleming asserts that the pre-1994 problems still afflict people. "People are starving,
there are problems of access to water, services." (Fleming: interview 2002) But there is
increased questioning. Fleming attributes this to civil society organisations. In response
government has often countered by questioning the legitimacy of civil society. That the
organised voice in civil society consists in the main of "well established white liberal
organisations" has given some credence to government charges (Zamisa: interview
2003). This raises the issue of accountability which has long been a thorny subject in
the sector. While there is broad agreement as to the importance of accountability there
is little agreement on the meaning of the term. Edward and Hulme (1995) contend that
"accountability is generally intepreted as the means by which individuals and
organisations report to recognised authority,or authorities, and are held reponsible for
their actions" (9). They argue that "organisations tend to avoid accountability as much
as possible" (9).
Fleming agrees that accountability is a contentious issue in the sector. Smillie (1997)
explains the nature of civil society organisations and other NGOs.
They are accountable to their boards and members. this accountability may be
weak or strong, as it can be in the private sector. they are accountable to their
staff. they are accountable to their donors both small and large. failure to please
will mean a reduction in income. they are accountable to the media, upon which
they rely for much of their publicity.they are accountable - perhaps in most cases
more in aim than in deed - to their beneficiaries. they are accountable to their
peers, an accountability sometimes expressed as a code of conduct (Smillie 1997:
575).
Fleming recognises this when she asserts that "we are not accountable to anybody in
any formal structure unless it's a matter of becoming a membership of an organisation
but even then an organisation such as SANGOCO claims to be motivational" (Fleming:
interview 2002). Naidu sees way out: professionalism within the organisation. Edward
and Hulme (1995) encapsulate this:
Effective accountability requires a statement of goals (whether in adherence to certain
rules or achievement of identified performance levels), transparency of decision
making relationships, honest reporting of what resources have been used and what
has been achieved, an appraisal process for the overseeing of authority (ies) to judge
whether results are satisfactory and concrete mechanisms for holding to account (Le
rewarding or penalising) those responsible for performance (Edward and Hulme, 1995:
9).
Both USAID and the Konrad Adenauer Stittung emphasized the primacy of financial
accountability. In an apparent attempt to ensure continued access to financial support
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from donors IDASA and DDP can be said to focus on employing performance
measurements which may:
[ ... ] distort accountability by overemphasizing short-term quantitative targets,
standardising indicators, focusing attention exclusively on individual projects or
organisations, and favouring hierarchical management structures - a tendency to
'accountancy' rather than 'accountability'; audit rather than learning (Edwards and
Hulme 1995: 13).
Masihleho (personal communication, October 30, 2002) asserts that USAID uses annual
audits, submission of monthly expenditure reports and annual financial statements to
handle accountability issues and reporting arrangements. Fleming at IDASA sees real
problems for smaller organisations which may exacerbate this tendency to
'accountancy'.
I think that smaller organisations don't always get opportunities to engage with the
funders. Also the bigger funders tend to take a little more time about it so. If you
want more money you may have to go to a longer negotiations process and have a
bigger capacity to deliver on project and have more people to do it and the
administrative systems good accounting systems all that kind of stuff... [This] is not
easy for small organisation to have all these things... we do have those structures
we have accounting systems we have finance managers. We have [ ... ] all those
kind of people who know the system and those kinds of things. It makes it easier
for us [ ... ] oh we'll do all the proposals and I do reports as well but when it comes
to finance I have a lot of help for finance people which we have. I think as bigger
organisation we have excess to people of capacity that's why the organisation...
(can) engage with bigger funders In a small organisation project managers have to
do all that. its tough! (Fleming: interview, 2002)
Hicks asserts that due to these capacity issues that CBOs "don't seem as being reliable,
accountable or skilled enough. You know they (donors) want an organization that's not
going to die in three month's time. We know of how CBOs died down when they ran out
of funding. They (donors) want to see all the financial statements for the past three
years. Description of whether they have ever done a financial statement before. They
don't have money to pay an accountant... "(Hicks: interview 2003). Fleming argues
further that different funding organisations "have different requirements" and reporting
requirements. While these conditions may be handled satisfactorily in a large civil
society organisations or university (Habib: interview 2003), the same is not true for
community based organisations, social movements and small civil society.
Habib and Kotze (2002) while noting this bias towards bigger, more formalised NGOs
and the fact that they have "become mere implementers of donor and government
'development' agendas" (13) question the will of CSOs for developing an alternative
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development agenda. They argue that given CSOs' general dependency on external
funding, donors tend to have "undue influence on the shape of civil society" (33).
Habib and Kotze charge that an alternative agenda lies with smaller, more radical
grassroots organisations and movements, which this research found to be out of the
funding loop. According to Hicks the lack of support for CBOs is "creating division
between NGOs and CBOs because CBOs, for example, do the actual work in rural
areas....They are doing it out of their passion and their conviction and out of their
inspiration because otherwise they are not going to fit into this. They are not being
funded and in the main, speaking about dollars, they (donors) don't want to fund
small CBOs" (Hicks: interview 2003).
Grassroots organisations are the ones who really do the work, they are the ones
who give all ideas, getting involved but they are not funded. But NGOs (CSOs)
work with media receiving all the funding, doing training... You know NGOs
aren't comfortable with CBOs, that's exactly the problem on the floor. At the
moment they (CBOs) are almost trapped because they are desperate for some
sort of help, NGOs come with resources but NGOs are accountable to their
boards...(Hicks: interview 2003)
By supporting big professionalised NGOs, with the capacity to meet complicated funding
requirements donors make a value-laden choice in favour of one section of society to
the direct detriment of others. There is no doubt at all that many CSOs in South Africa,
for the sake of survival, tailor their funding proposals to the known priority areas of
particular funders. "Compromises and trade-offs thus become the order of the day and
development becomes unavoidably donor-driven" (Habib and Kotze 2002: 33-34).
Edwards and Hulme note that NGOs, grassroots organisations (GRas) and civil society
organisations (CSOs) can be accountable upwards and downwards. Upwards relates to
accountability to trustees, donors and government while downwards relates to staff,
partners and supporters. According to Smillie (1997), while there is a perception that
NGOs lack legitimacy or that they are not accountable to anyone they in fact have
multiple accountabilities. When in balance these accountabilities have a positive
influence on an organisation allowing for the amicable management of the interests of
different stakeholders (Smillie 1995: 575). But it is often the exception when the
interests of different stakeholders are in equilibrium. A general situation is that
accountability to a specific stakeholder takes precedence over others. For instance
donor objectives can be at variance with the interests of other stakeholders, a
compromise will reflect the power dynamics within the individual organisation. Hicks
sees a similar dynamic in the way CSOs relate to CBOs;
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They (CSOs) are not asking them. They always come and ask them, "are you
happy with what we providing? Funding to the organizations, that are doing
work in your areas'? Many of these NGOs are going to be asking those
questions about the C60s. No one is asking them (C60s) for their opinion... or
channelling feedback or criticism to them ... So there's a real problem there
Habib and Kotze (2002) argue that "the primary line of accountability is most often to
donors. And, generally, in this unequal playing field, it is the more organised, more
articulate, urban-based players that walk away with the prize" (34). The Civicus Index
on Civil Society South Africa Country Report (2001) found that there was "a perception
that CSOs are more accountable to their donors than to their beneficiaries" (50). How to
overcome this divide is a central problem. The central challenge is how to create
conditions for what Habermas (1987) termed "communicative action". While Habermas
(1987) believed that societies need integration, he also recognised that they were in
crisis because as advanced capitalism has taken hold, the integrative function of
communication has increasingly faltered. As a consequence the legitimation of social
institutions is questionable. According to Habermas (1987), legitimation refers to the
general sense on the part of the citizens that the institutions that govern them are just,
good and deserving of support and adherence. A legitimacy crisis arises when
communicative action has been colonised by a particular discourse, or particular
interests. This 'colonisation' undermines legitimacy, and it can be argued that the
influence of donors constitutes a crisis of legitimacy for civil society in South Africa. In
the recommendation section, this study proposes to describe the conditions that would
lead to the re-constitution of the 'Iifeworld' or the overthrow of what Habermas (1987)
called the "colonisation of 'lifeworld' in order to restore legitimacy.
Functional accountability refers to responsibility for, and use of, resources and the
consequent impact of those resources (Edwards and Hulme 1995). Success or
alternatively failure is then measured in terms of the extent to which a project or
programmes deliver on stated goals. Strategic accountability which is more complex
consists of attempting to account for the impact of organisational actions on other
organisations as well as the wider environment or country. Measurement is subjective
and success or failure is dependent on how important stakeholders see organisational
progress rather than merely accounting for financial probity
Effective accountability requires a statement of goals (Whether in adherence to
certain rules or achievement of identified performance levels), transparency of
decision making relationships, honest reporting of what resources have been used
and what has been achieved, an appraisal process for the overseeing of authority
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(ies) to judge whether results are satisfactory and concrete mechanisms for holding
to account (Le rewarding or penalising) those responsible for performance (Edward
and Hulme, 1995:9).
Teichmann of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung confirms:
We are still in the process of developing evaluation tools. We do not have a strategy
in place for determining the long-term effects of our work. It is difficult to tell what
influence the Foundation is having on South African democratisation (Teichmann:
interview, 2002).
Monitoring and evaluation are crucial in attending to the critical conceptual questions:
does a stronger civil society actually lead to improved democracy? Does democracy lead
to improved services, greater equity and improved advantage for weaker social groups?
A question that follows directly from this: Does strengthening civil society result in pro-
poor policies?
According to Pratt (www.intrac.org), a central challenge in developing monitoring and
evaluation is, the absence of conceptual clarity underpinning many civil society,
strengthening programmes. He identifies three specific challenges:
2. Attribution: given the long chains of causation, it is difficult to know what
effect can be attributed to the intervention.
3. Being realistic about goals and setting clear objectives within the
resources available.
4. Clarity over time frames: too many programmes are very short-term in
design and in vision. It is important to distinguish between short and
longer term objectives and the methods to monitor them
(www.intrac.org).
Tandon (1995) contends that governance determines the rules and boundaries which
form the basis of an NGO's accountability and gUide the approach to development, the
use of resources and aims of the organisation. Accountability is assured when NGOs
embrace good governance. Good governance achieves the following:
[It] ensures that programmes follow the requirements of the NGO mission; promotes
a performance orientation and accountability in the institution; and requires that the
values (integrity, participation, professionalism, quality and commitment), statutes
(reporting and legal standard procedures) and norms or socially concerned civic
institutions are articulated, practiced and promoted. An effective structure and
process of governance in an NGO is absolutely critical for ensuring accountability in a
wider sense (Tandon 1995: 48).
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In an apparent attempt to please donors, NGOs increasingly use performance
measurements which may:
[ ... ] distort accountability by overemphasizing short-term quantitative targets,
standardising indicators, focusing attention exclusively on individual projects or
organisations, and favouring hierarchical management structures - a tendency to
'accountancy' rather than 'accountability'; audit rather than learning (Edwards and
Hulme 1995: 13).
Edwards and Hulme note that NGOs, grassroots organisations (GRas) and civil society
organisations (CSOs) can be accountable upwards and downwards. Upwards relates to
accountability to trustees, donors and government while downwards relates to staff,
partners and supporters.
Expansion of the networks involving donors, governments, recipient communities and
other NGOs can mitigate the influence of one actor vis-a-vis others. According to
Edwards and Hulme (1992), a large network can also broaden the ability of an CSO to
pick and choose players it wishes to work with. A viable option may be to encourage
multiple accountabilities which can lessen the influence of powerful organisations.
Teichmann speaking for the Konrad Adenauer Foundation argues elsewhere that donors
have guidelines that determine areas of engagement. While this is understandable, in
that the activities they undertake must be informed by the interests of their constituents
in the home country, this brings up many questions. USAID for instance contends that
It appear that the determination by these donors of areas of engagement and the
formalised manner in which funds can be accessed (through tenders, proposals and so
on) clearly favours professionalised civil society organisations over grassroots and social
movements. This situation has resulted in some instances in the growth of
professionalised fundraising departments within some civil society organisations. The
focus within these departments is on scanning areas of donor interest, attempting to
forecast areas of interest and then designing project or programme proposals
accordingly. Piven and Cloward (1977) in their work on social movements argue that
ways of participation and the "degree of influence that resulted, are [were] consistently
determined by location in the class structure" (3). This issue brings into question the
claims by proponents of civil society as a check on the power of the state. For instance
Habib and Kotze assert that "new plans and funding preferences of technocrats,
however, have led to more fingerpointing and fiercer competition between NGOs and
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have opened up a growing divide between the formal structures and their smaller
grassroots-based counterparts" Habib and Kotze (2002: 13).
Notwithstanding the high sounding rhetoric of the donor policy statements such as
'making globalisation work for the poor', anyone seriously concerned about the true
democratisation of the third world societies and following the developments cannot
be sure whether the donors are interested, or will ever be interested in raising those
fundamental issues without which it is unlikely that the rhetoric could ever move in
the direction of realisation" (Kakarala 2001: 3).
can professionalised civil society organisations, manned largely by middle class elites
champion the interests of the marginalized and poor? Habib and Kotze (2002) argue
that answers may be found in accountability. "The primary line of accountability is most
often to donors. And, generally, in this unequal playing field, it is the more organised,
more articulate, urban-based players that walk away with the prize" (Habib and Kotze
2000: 34). But is this something unusual? Piven and C10ward (1977) contend that
situations when protest or contestation is possible among the poor, "the forms that it
must take, and the impact it can have are all delimited by the social structure in ways
that usually diminish its extent and diminish its force" (3) and in this case by eliminating
critical issues from the agenda of CSOs the donors are limiting space for the lower
classes to press for their class interests. According Habermas (1986) class structures
persist as long as the means of production and labour are deployed in ways that reflect
sectional interests in society. The challenge is therefore to expand space for the lower
classes through donors channelling funds to the grassroots community based
organisations (CBOs) and to emergent social movements and promoting independence
of the mainstream CSOs through liberal funding.
An approach that seeks to broadly build the capacity of all manner of civil society
organisations to engage and make claims on the state on behalf of various
constituencies may be effective. If the intention is to nurture a civil society, which is not
only reflective of South Africa's broad temperament, there is a need for a more
developmental approach to capacity building. Clayton (1996) defines capacity building
as an ongoing process of helping individuals, groups of people, organisations and
societies to improve and to adapt to the changes. It is important to stress that this is
deliberate intervention. According to INTRAC (www.intrac.org) interventions aiming to
entrench the capacity of civil society must out of necessity go beyond short-term,
compartmentalised and donor-driven approaches. "Instead, such interventions need to
be based on a deep contextual analysis of the state of civil society development in a
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given country combined with an understanding of the nature of organisational
processes, both internally and in terms of external relations between organisations"
(www.intrac.org).
This is consistent with past practice between Third World states or organisations that
donors set conditions or more accurately conditionalities. The manner in which the
deliverance of the Third World's masses from poverty and underdevelopment to a new
era of enlightened democratic rule and development with civil society as one of the
guiding principles requires that ways of doing things must change. If civil society is
going to play a meaningful role, a democratising role, it cannot depend on foreign
funding to a "select few organisations" influencing public policy.
These findings suggest however, that while there may be room for civil society
organisations to manoeuvre, the resource weakness of these organisations points to
donor organisations having far-reaching impact on the sector. Previous research
suggests that donors tend to support certain organisations engaged in particular
activities (Hearn 1999). Habib and Kotze (2002) argue further that shifting donor
priorities often determine which "CSOs will live and which are to die, and in the process,
consciously or unconsciously transplant their own values and worldviews on the
recipients of aid" (33). While research found tentative signs that civil society
organisations were finding ways to engage donors on their own terms this is only
partially borne out by this work. This research found that donors were largely setting
the agenda. The analysis suggested that civil society organisations were being corralled
into activities that were broadly determined by the availability of funding.
This situation gives ammunition to those who speculate that the civil society dynamic
offers new arguments that justify intervention in developing countries, if necessary
bypassing local states or governments. According to Habib and Kotze (2002) these
pressures emanate from "neo-liberal technocrats' desire to contain the state and
transfer its responsibilities to non-state actors" (13). Kakarala (2001) argues that at one
level donors tend to perceive strengthening civil society vis-a-vis the state as a
progressive move. Vigilance on the state is the central role for a strong civil society in
any democratic society. Kakarala (2001) further asserts that there are deep inequalities
- political, economic, social and cultural - in civil societies, which results in
undemocratic dimensions. On their side donors acknOWledge "at least in words if not
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deeds, that societies in third world are 'complex' and their policies must be formulated
carefully" (3).
The overall results of this research show that donors are having a selective impact on
civil society in South Africa: certain elements, capabilities and organisations in the sector
are being empowered vis-a-vis others. Kakarala (2001) identifies three streams of donor
funding generally. The first focuses on assistance to disempowered section of society.
Hearn (1999) identifies a second, which is the strengthening of civil society vis-a-vis the
state. Moen Mathiot (cited in Kakarala 2001) contends that the successful area of
activity in civil society building has been urban-based professional elite NGOs whose
main focus is scrutinising the activities of the state. A third strand supports individuals,
institutions and programmes that "subtly as well as loudly work for the realisation of a
'free market' economy" (3).
Through their control over resources, these selected donors are able to set the agenda
for CSOs, which tends to reinforce the hegemonic position of the dominant classes in
the country and that of their allies in the North. The donors have some links with
Northern governments and dominant classes there. This they achieve primarily through
moderating the activities of these CSOs and excluding critical and controversial issues
from receiving funds and indirectly eliminating them from the agenda of these CSOs.
This however, is not to argue, as Edward and Hulme (1992) have demonstrated, that
the existence of a variety of donors does not open up spaces for CSOs to pick and
choose partners for activities that they want to do as organisations. In this regard,
Naidu of DDP and Hicks at CPP has pointed out some CSOs are coming up with a
framework of activities that they would like to do and then approach different donors to
resource particular activities. It will be proposed in this study that donors should widen
their understanding of civil society. In addition, it will be proposed that CSOs should be
encouraged to develop multiple accountabilities so as to lesson the negative influence of
donors.
Hearn (1999) demonstrated that civil society organisations committed to promoting
liberal democracy and economic liberalism were the most popular with donors while
looking at civil society in South Africa, Uganda and Ghana. As stated above, through
making funding for particular activities or programmes in these organisations this
research also found that donors may be having a disproportionate impact on agenda
setting on the South Africa's civil society terrain. For instance the research found that
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civil society organisations aiming to work with both USAID and the Konrad Adenauer
Foundation have to apply for funding following calls for tenders or proposals in areas
that are clearly spelled out by the donor organisations. While donors making funding
available for civil society activities in South Africa constitute a handful of organisations
their impact is telling. For example areas regarded as priority areas hinge largely on
donor's perceptions concerning areas of interest and their own requirements for
effective project implementation and reporting. Even activities that ostensibly seek to
build capacity across civil society as a sector ultimately are selective in addressing
capacity limitations in that not only must donors recognise that limitation they must also
be prepared to fund activities to address that shortcoming. Habib and Kotze (2002)
contend that while donor and government contracts may be useful for implementing
programmes and agendas, this must "imply the loss of the very quintessence of civil
society, namely its freedom and independence" (11).
The ability of civil society organisations to question and challenge those in power
tends to make (donors and governments) uncomfortable and its therefore in their
interest to involve them in ways that would lead to their de-politicization and
bureaucratisation (Habib and Kotze 2002).
It came out strongly with USAID and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation that calls to
tender or project proposals were largely determining or at the very least skewing areas
of civil society activity. It is reasonable to argue that beyond minor or cosmetic changes
there is little CSO participation in the formulation of local projects they implement. In
fact it can be argued that CSOs have not had a role beyond acting as implementing
agencies for donors. In a situation in which civil society organisations are not so weak
financially and there are competing sources of funding the role of particular players may
be mitigated.
Habermas (1987) makes an important contribution about the nature of media, which
can also be applied to civil society. With one type of media, in our case civil society,
money and power (votes) are quantitative, that is both money and votes can be
counted and whoever has the most wins. Another media by contrast is qualitative, that
is, it cannot be quantified because communication between people or groups can only
be experienced and not felt. Using this analysis in the South African case, it is clear that
donors have a quantitative advantage with regard to money. What is less clear is the
impact that they are having on the qualitative front. They can only be two possibilities
the first is the one already stated that their agendas are 'colonising' or have colonised
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this part as well. The second possibility is that they have failed to attain this but
because of the resource weakness of the un-favoured social movements and CBOs, civil
society fails to articulate a spectrum of sectarian interests. In both cases civil society
fails to act as a democratic watchdog vis-a-vis the state, fails in its democratising role
and cannot be said to be close to the poor or the marginalized.
In summary there appears to be no attempt to arrive at an understanding of the type or
form of civil society that would be consistent with entrenching democracy. There
appears to be nothing beyond the mantra of civil society is good for democracy. The
research did not discern an appreciation of methodological changes in the approaches
of the donors that would equip civil society organisations beyond the professionalised
ones to channel the concerns of all sections of South African society. But is this civil
society taking shape in South Africa at the moment necessarily good for democracy?
The research found that there is no real conscious effort to theorise on the part of
donors the kind of civil society that would be good for South Africa's democracy. The
result is that donors have essentially intervened to implement their own projects. "We
support several organisations to implement programs related to the objectives of our
civil society strengthening program. USAID also provides support to CSOs in the area of
HIV/Aids; Violence against women and children; housing and small enterprise"
(Masihleho personal communication, October 30, 2002).
5:2 Approaches and Methodologies
While the selective intervention of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung has a rigorous
conceptual basis, balanced by the presence of other German political foundations doing
similar work with different players and ironclad financial independence, the approach of
the USAID, while employing a similar selective approach in finding partners to work
with, is markedly different. According to Masihleho (interview: 2002), USAID aims to
promote US government policy and that policy may change from time to time depending
on the ruling party.
As noted elsewhere German political foundations obtain almost all their funding from
the government through the Ministry for Economic Co-operation but they are highly
autonomous institutions (Lingnau 1997). For instance, while they must apply for funding
on a project or programme basis, the application is nothing more than a formality (Mair
199Gb). The USAID on the other hand is an arm of the US government implementing
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government policy, which can be expected to pursue US interests as enunciated by an
incumbent administration. This approach is problematic for a number of reasons. As
highlighted earlier, Naidu (interview: 2002) and Zamisa (interview 2003) have noted
there is a tendency to 'a flavour of the month' with many of the donors. This can
present insurmountable problems for civil society organisations attempting to build
sustainable institutions. For example, the current Republican Administration in the
United States has ruled out the use of US aid funds for abortion and abortion related
activities. One major casualty may be the United Nations Population Fund. At a stroke,
organisations and services have had to find alternative funding or fold up. There have
been accusations that this may be undertaken for domestic political considerations
(www.globalpolicv.org/finance/unagencies/unfpa).This vulnerability to external
demands or resources clearly points to the inadequacy and the problematic nature of
external intervention in moulding local institutions.
While the German model for developing civil society has considerable merit - taken to its
ultimate conclusion, it requires widespread intervention in South African politics to be
able to create the kind of pluralism and diversity the system theoretically aims to
produce. At the same time, it would be essentially reproducing political schisms
reflecting broadly the general political consensus in Germany. While it can be argued
that a kind of synthesis would result from the interaction of a German political
Foundation and a partner South African civil society organisation, the extent of
involvement required would not only be impractical but appears politically unacceptable.
It is apparent that the current approaches are falling short of the ideal of assisting to
nurture a civil society truly reflective of South Africa's diverse community. It has been
argued from various positions that civil society organisations are important in society, it
can then be further advanced that as vital components of society, where these
institutions are absent or under-funded problems can arise. This research takes this
theme further and argues that civil society organisations are beholden to external
pressures and as a consequence they may not necessarily work to articulate broad
societal concerns. As this appears to be largely the case, civil society organisations
cannot function in aid of democratisation.
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5:3 Recommended Approach
A strategy that builds civil society capacity must begin from the premise that
strengthening of civil society should be an end in itself. Put another way, the end is to
enable civil society organisations to attain whatever objective they determine for
themselves. Garbutt (www.intrac.org) stresses the importance of supporting the
emergence of analytical, freethinking leadership of civil society within transitional
countries that will be able to forge its own models of engagement with both the state
and the market. Clayton (1996) sees capacity bUilding as an element of empowerment,
which allows civil society to play its role of being a counterbalance to the state and to
market forces.
Lipson (www.intrac.org) puts forward a developmental approach to civil society
strengthening initiatives, rooted in an integrated understanding of CSOs and how they
develop within a particular context. She lists the following issues as critical to this
exercise:
• a clear contextual analysis of the nature of civil society and its level of
development in the country or region in question;
• a contextualised understanding of organisational life cycles and how these
influence the capacity of CSOs to engage in proposed interventions;
• an integrated analysis of linkages at all stages during the capacity-building
intervention, recognising and working with vertical and horizontal linkages
between society and the individual;
• addressing issues of behavioural and organisational change. This involves not
merely accepting cultural norms such as attitudes to authority, decision-making
and gender relations, but also changing them;
• clarity concerning how the intervention will incorporate learning and knowledge
management throughout its timespan;
• openness on the part of resource providers to articulate their own agenda and
make themselves part of the capacity building process; in others words, a
willingness to change. Donors need to adapt very different tools and timeframes
in strengthening civil society to those used in the more familiar output-oriented
projects and programmes;
• a truly developmental approach to civil society capacity bUilding must have at its
core the subjects themselves as principal protagonists (Lipson www.intrac.org).
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It is quite apparent that there is no strategy on the part of USAID to undertake any
project of this magnitude. While the Konrad Adenauer Foundation has a limited
mandate given the parameters set out by the political party, which it is affiliated to, the
presence of other German political foundations affiliated to other political parties should
in theory produce a certain political diversity. According to Mair (1997), successful
political aid needs the following:
• values and plurality on the part of the donors;
• a long-term, but flexible approach in implementing programmes;
• professional and thorough analyses of political development;
• accountability and transparency on the part of donor organisations;
• a minimum of political space for civil society organisations (Mair 1997: 10).
The research found little diversity in the work of donors, in fact it found significant
coordination, in which the donor organisations essentially funded similar activities.
Coordination aimed to avoid 'overlay' and funding the same activities.
The relationship between availability of funding and activities undertaken is the most
compelling. As hypothesized, the availability of funding and by extension donor
sanctioned interests appears to determine the areas of engagement of civil society
organisations. The hypothesis of this research was largely supported by the findings:
while there were attempts by civil society organisations to craft their own areas of
interest and selectively seek funding from a variety of donors, the limited diversity in
terms of areas of interest of donors and donors efforts at coordination of activities
meant that these efforts had little significance in terms of extending areas of coverage.
These findings suggest that the influence of donor on civil society calls into question the
role of civil society in pursuing policy issues, which anchor democracy. How often do the
interests of donors coincide with the interests of average South African citizens?
5:4 Policy Recommendations
These findings should be taken into consideration when designing policies and programs
to build a civil society that is truly reflective of the broad spectrum of civil society
concerns in South Africa. In particular, policies, which aim to build capacity across civil
society as a sector, should be encouraged if civil society is to act as pressure valve for
societal concerns. Particular attention should be given to designing interventions that
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enable organizations representing or organizations from poor, rural and marginalized
areas to articulate their concerns. This will take a lot more involvement from donors and
other players than has hitherto been the case. If undertaken this will give credence to
claims that civil society can act in the interests of democratization and democratic
consolidation.
The results also underline the need to confront the prevailing power incongruences that
underpin policy influences in the society. According to Habib and Kotze (2002), the
divide between the formalised professionalised NGOs and smaller grassroots-based
counterparts seems to mirror wider inequalities and divisions in societies generally.
While this may not be in itself problematic, the reality that those organisations that are
best disposed to articulate their interests are the ones that have consistently been able
to access support from donors presents fundamental challenges to the ability of civil
society to play a democratising role, or indeed act as a forum to articulate policy
alternatives. Thus, it is important to pay particular attention to power dynamics in
programs undertaken by civil society. Challenging these issues and illuminating the role
that civil society is playing in South Africa is an important first step in bringing clarity to
the concept and its practical implications. This is important in that where significant
portions of civil society fail to play this democratising role or watchdog role it would
therefore be critical to encourage the growth of other institutions that can undertake
this role.
In recent years, there has been a tendency in developing countries for the smallerCBOs that are truly closer to ordinary people's lives, to start organising around thehuman fall-out of neo-liberal programmes. They tend to organise around quitespecific issues and identities, broadly related to issues of economic and socialexclusion and exploitation. Social observers and analysts are always speculatingabout the significance of these developments and whether they have the potential tobe harnessed into broader-based social movements with real potential to challengethe status quo (Habib and Kotze 2002: 13).
Thus, although these findings only partially support the hypothesis that donor funding is
acting to corral civil society in particular directions and therefore impacting on the form
that civil society is taking in South Africa this research does highlight the limited
opportunities open to innovative CSOs. But the resource weakness of the sector needs
urgent attention. Acquainting donors with the broad interests of key civil society
organisations across the spectrum of the sector is an important first step, as is forcefully
making the case that merely supporting urban-based elite organisations with powerful
connections falls far short of ensuring that civil society plays its potentially
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democratising role. The fundamental objective though, should be to confront or rather





This dissertation has attempted to locate pressures determining the direction of key civil
society activities. The resource weakness of South Africa's civil society places significant
challenges on the sector's ability to play a democratising role. It also highlights the lack
of substance in terms such as partnerships, participation in the current globalising
context. The external aid dependence of much civil society strengthening has led to a
situation that undermines the long-term sustainability of civil society. Resource
weakness in the civil society exacerbates this tendency. It is plausible to speculate the
notion of civil society, as a tool to deal with the problems confronting South Africa may
be irrelevant. Part of this may be explained by the manner in which epochs shape
context and by extension institutions such as civil society. For instance, in Latin America
and Eastern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s the term civil society pointed to struggles
for autonomy from oppressive regimes. In the 1990s as the term has entered
development lexicon it has been deployed to attain an omnibus number of objectives.
This general lack of conceptual clarity on civil society complicates the situation.
Echoing the position of Howell (1995), this research takes the view that civil society
does not lend itself to "external manufacturing." While external funding places
discernible pressures on the operations of civil society, this research, however found
that civil society organisations are finding space within the broad funding framework to
pick and choose partners for activities that they want to do as organisations.
In light of the manner in which civil society is fundamentally functioning in South Africa,
it is credible to speculate that it is aiming to broadly legitimate and support a policy
regime that is essentially neo-liberal while not primarily working to elevate citizen work
with regard to public policy. This is particularly apparent when looking at activities that
are receiving support. At the international level, it has been speculated that donor
countries, international financial institutions and governments have employed the notion
of civil society in ways that allow states to corral citizen action in ways that suit
governing agendas while not encouraging the mobilisation of social activity. Do the
activities undertaken by civil society organisations in South Africa speak to the needs of
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the majority of South Africans? While these issues would remain whatever tool was
being employed, it does question the usefulness of civil society as an organising concept
to advance development and democracy.
The challenge must be to go beyond the rhetoric of partnership, ownership and
accountability. It is apparent that without altering the present power incongruencies
there is little possibility in talking of recasting the relationship between donors and civil
society groups. An ideal likely solution may be to get donors to 'put their money where
they mouth is' or 'walk the talk' and 'understand' that the consolidation of democracy is
in everyone's interest (including them. A practical solution, which may have immediate
validity, may be to encourage multiple accountabilities, which can lessen the influence
of powerful organisations such as donors.
Having pointed out the shortcomings of civil society organisations, it is also important to
stress that as problematic as they are presently constituted, they play an important role
in holding the government accountable for a range of responsibilities. For instance, they
have attempted to bring substance to the constitution by pointing to social and
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